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THE RIGHT TO POSTHUMOUS BODILY INTEGRITY 
AND IMPLICATIONS OF WHOSE RIGHT IT IS 
Hilary Young* 
I. INTRODUCTION
A. BODY WORLDS & BODIES THE EXHIBITION: A MORAL 
CONTROVERSY
Millions of people in dozens of cities around the world have 
flocked to museum exhibits of preserved human cadavers.1  The 
best-known versions of the exhibits, Body Worlds2 and Bodies: The 
Exhibition,3 aim to be both educational and artistic. The dead are 
posed as though they were riding a skateboard or performing a 
trapeze routine. One man is displayed as though his body were 
exploding, so that the viewer can see many anatomical systems 
simultaneously.  A fetus still inside its dead mother is on view, 
and in a Body Worlds exhibit in Berlin, bodies were posed as 
though they were having sex. Stripped of flesh, the copulating 
cadavers caused controversy, which is nothing new for these 
boundary-pushing exhibits.4
     * Hilary Young is an Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Law at the 
University of New Brunswick.  The author wishes to thank Anne 
Alstott and the students in Harvard’s Legal Scholarship seminar for 
helpful comments on this work.  She especially wishes to thank Glenn 
Cohen for his valuable feedback on drafts of this article. 
 1.  See generally Lisa Giunta, The Dead on Display: A Call for the International 
Regulation of Plastination Exhibits, 49 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 164 (2010) (giving 
background on the exhibits and the legal and ethical issues raised by these exhibits). 
 2.  See generally BODY WORLDS, http://www.bodyworlds.com/en/prelude.html 
(last visited May 14, 2013). 
 3.  See generally BODIES THE EXHIBITION, http://www.bodiestheexhibition.com 
(last visited May 14, 2013). 
 4.  Jason Rhodes, Body Worlds Plans Cadaver Show Dedicated to Sex, REUTERS,
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There are essentially three types of moral objection that can 
be levied against this kind of display of human corpses. A 
dignitary argument might claim that it is undignified to display 
human bodies in this manner or to display bodies for profit. 
That is, it harms the living human public to treat our dead in this 
way.  Such dignitary concerns explain why, for example, we 
legally require the dead to be disposed of (usually buried or 
cremated) in a dignified manner or why states have criminal 
prohibitions on the undignified treatment of a corpse.5  As a 
society, we recognize the possibility that undignified treatment 
of the dead can harm the living public as a whole.  This potential 
criticism of preserved cadaver exhibits may be independent of 
any prior consent by the deceased. If one thinks it undignified to 
put corpses on public display for profit, one may think this 
regardless of whether the deceased consented (although one 
may think it less undignified if there was prior consent). 
A second potential objection to Body Worlds-type displays of 
human cadavers is the harm such use of corpses could cause to 
the friends and family of the deceased. Although bodies are 
rendered anonymous by removing skin, hair, and other 
identifying features, families could object to the very idea of 
their loved one’s remains suffering this fate. This differs from 
the indignity example above in that the harm here is not to 
humanity in general, but rather to specific individuals by virtue 
of their relationship with the deceased. Friends and family have 
a well-recognized interest in the treatment of loved one’s mortal 
remains and this interest is recognized in laws that grant 
possessory rights in a corpse to next of kin and allow next of kin 
to make decisions about the treatment of the body – either 
regardless of, or in the absence of, the expressed wishes of the 
deceased.6
A third potential objection to preserved cadaver exhibits 
relates to harm to the individuals themselves, either before or 
Sept. 11, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE58A4Z220090911. 
 5.  See discussion infra Part IV. 
 6.  See id.
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after their death. This potential objection best explains the policy 
of seeking the individual’s consent. In fact much of the 
controversy over Bodies: The Exhibition relates to a lack of prior 
consent by the people whose bodies were used.  For example, 
New York governor Andrew Cuomo reacted with concern to the 
fact that Premier Exhibitions, the company responsible for 
Bodies: The Exhibition, was unable to establish consent for this use 
of the bodies.7  It was alleged that some of these bodies were 
those of executed Chinese prisoners.8
This third potential objection is not unique to the display of 
cadavers: there are many laws that reflect the importance of 
posthumous bodily integrity by granting individuals the right to 
make decisions about the treatment of their future corpses. 
These include organ donation law and laws that allow one to 
choose burial or cremation, as well as laws governing Body 
Worlds-type displays.9 This article examines such laws granting 
individuals the right to make decisions about the treatment of 
their future corpses. It asks whether these laws aim to protect 
only the rights of living individuals in order to give them 
confidence their wishes will be respected, or whether they 
protect the dead as well.  It also examines the implications for 
policy of whether the dead are viewed as capable of having 
rights in relation to their bodies.  For example, if all rights are 
viewed as ending at death, it may be easier to justify procuring 
organs from those whose wishes about organ donation are 
unknown, even in the absence of consent. 
It is, I think, intuitively obvious that the prior wishes of the 
 7.  Press Release, N.Y. State Attorney General, Cuomo Settlement With 
“bodies. . . .the Exhibition” Ends the Practice of Using Human Remains of Suspect 
Origins (May 29, 2008), available at http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/cuomo-
settlement-bodies-exhibition-ends-practice-using-human-remains-suspect-origins.  
See also Sewell Chan, ‘Bodies’ Show Must Put Up Warnings, N.Y. TIMES CITY ROOM 
BLOG (May 29, 2008, 12:14 PM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/ 
05/29/bodies-exhibit-must-put-up-warnings/.   
 8.  Press Release, N.Y. State Attorney General, Cuomo Settlement With 
“bodies. . . .the Exhibition” Ends the Practice of Using Human Remains of Suspect 
Origins (May 29, 2008), available at http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/cuomo-
settlement-bodies-exhibition-ends-practice-using-human-remains-suspect-origins.  
 9.  See discussion infra Part IV. 
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deceased are morally relevant to certain treatments of human 
remains: it is somehow wrong to put Chinese prisoners’ bodies 
on display without consent, or perhaps to bury someone who 
wanted to be cremated.  But it is less clear why that should be so.  
How is the non-consensual display of cadavers, or burying 
someone who wanted to be cremated, wrongful?  The deceased 
presumably has no awareness of her present condition or any 
capacity to be affected by it; and, it, therefore, is not obvious that 
she can be harmed.10  In addition, if we assume that the Chinese 
prisoners or the people whose fate it was to be buried never had 
any inkling that this was what was in store for their remains, the 
fact of their display or burial had no effect on them while they 
were alive. 
B. LEGAL RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS REGARDING TREATMENT OF 
THEIR CORPSES
There are at least three reasons why lawmakers would 
recognize a legal right of individuals to make decisions about 
the treatment of their own corpses.  First, we may think that the 
dead have an ongoing interest in the integrity of their dead 
bodies.  Living individuals have an interest in their bodily 
integrity that grounds rights against interference without 
consent.  We may conceive of this interest in bodily integrity as 
surviving death, such that to contravene people’s prior wishes is 
to harm the dead.  The theory that the dead have interests that 
can ground rights is controversial, but it may be the easiest to 
reconcile with some laws granting rights to make decisions 
about one’s future cadaver. 
Second, we may grant the ability to make decisions about 
the treatment of one’s own corpse because living people care 
about what happens to their bodies after death and we want to 
give them confidence that their wishes will be respected after 
death.  On this view, the dead need not have rights.  The reason 
 10.  There is actually philosophical controversy over whether the dead can be 
harmed.  This possibility will be discussed in detail in continuing parts. 
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for respecting people’s wishes, even after they are dead, is to 
give comfort to the living.  This is uncontroversial: we want to 
give the living confidence that their wishes will be respected, 
regardless of whether we also view the dead as having interests 
and rights in their own right. 
Third, we may protect an interest in posthumous bodily 
integrity because, as a society, we wish to see ourselves as 
people who respect the wishes of the dead.  This could be 
because we believe the dead have moral interests and we want 
to act morally by respecting those interests, or because we think 
the living will benefit if we respect the prior wishes of the dead.  
It could be because we promise people that we will respect their 
wishes, and we want to be a society that keeps our promises.  It 
could also be because we perceive that respecting the wishes of 
the dead honors the lives of those who have died.  The reasons 
need not be determined: what matters on this approach is that 
the importance of an interest in posthumous bodily integrity 
derives, at least in part, from the fact that we as a society want to 
see ourselves in a certain light: it is society that benefits by 
respecting the wishes of the dead. 
The focus of this article is the first two reasons for 
protecting posthumous bodily integrity.  The third is largely 
ignored, just as other competing interests in the treatment of 
corpses (those of potential organ recipients, for example, or of 
the families of the deceased) are largely ignored.  The aim of the 
article is to examine the implications of whether the dead have 
an interest in posthumous bodily integrity, or whether the 
interest in bodily integrity is extinguished by death. 
C. LIVING VERSUS DECEASED INTEREST HOLDERS
This article, therefore, considers two potential interest-
holders: the living individual in relation to her own future 
cadaver, and the deceased “individual” (for lack of a better 
term) in relation to her (present) cadaver.  It then addresses the 
implications of whose interests the law aims to protect when it 
grants individuals the right to make binding decisions about the 
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treatment of their corpse.  This is not to deny that others have an 
interest in the treatment of a corpse: surviving family and 
potential organ recipients are just two examples.  However, the 
question at issue is: what follows from a view that the dead do, 
or do not, have an ongoing interest in their posthumous bodily 
integrity? 
While alive, we all have an interest in bodily integrity that is 
protected by law.  For example, the law prohibits non-
consensual touching: any physical interference without consent 
is potentially criminal assault and tortious battery.11  The laws 
that protect a person’s interest in bodily integrity grant legal 
rights to living individuals.  That is, perhaps obviously, the 
rights-holder is the individual whose body is at stake.  As with 
the treatment of dead bodies, other individuals and society, in 
general, may have an interest in the treatment of other peoples’ 
living bodies.  For example, society as a whole has an interest in 
ensuring that living human bodies are treated with dignity.  As a 
result, some interferences cannot legally be consented to, such as 
serious bodily harm.  The existence of competing interests does 
not negate the fact that individuals have an interest in what 
happens to their own bodies and that this interest is, to varying 
degrees, protected by law. 
That one’s interest in one’s body, and related legal 
protection of the interest, should also extend to one’s dead body 
is not obvious.  Yet few interferences with a corpse, other than 
some kind of dignified disposal, are permitted without consent – 
either the prior consent of the deceased or substitute consent of 
the next of kin.  This is perhaps not so surprising when we 
consider how much many people care about what happens to 
their bodies after they die.  Many care deeply about whether 
their bodies are buried or cremated, the subject of medical 
research, or treated with dignity, and whether their organs are 
removed for transplant.12
 11.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 13, 18 (1965). 
 12.  A poignant example can be found in Drew Gilpin Faust’s excellent book on 
death in the Civil War.  One soldier worried: “It is dreadful to contemplate being 
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In granting individuals the right to decide what happens to 
their bodies after their death, the law creates rights-holders in 
relation to those bodies.  This may seem obvious – even 
tautologous – but a question arises how to characterize the 
holder of this legal right.  There are at least two ways of 
conceiving of these rights-holders.  First, they are only living 
individuals whose bodies will become the corpses at issue.  At 
the moment of death, that person’s legal right to posthumous 
bodily integrity would cease because there is no longer any 
entity with moral status to possess that particular right.  This 
does not mean that the law could not still be enforced, but 
enforcement would only serve the function of giving confidence 
to other living individuals that their own wishes will be carried 
out.  There would be no legal obligation to the deceased on the 
basis of a right to posthumous bodily integrity. 
Alternately, the legal right to posthumous bodily integrity 
could belong to dead “individuals” themselves: in other words, 
people’s right to posthumous bodily integrity could survive 
death.  Several scholars consider the dead to be capable of 
having moral status and of possessing legal rights, and the 
article considers the basis on which the dead could be 
considered to have an interest in posthumous bodily integrity 
and what implications would follow for the law if they had such 
an interest. 
Whether a right to posthumous bodily integrity belongs to 
the living individual only or survives death may seem a rather 
fine, and perhaps irrelevant distinction: the relevant laws apply 
regardless.  However, in analyzing these laws from the 
perspective of the different potential rights-bearer, three types of 
insight emerge.  First, the reasons for having laws protecting 
posthumous bodily integrity are different depending on who the 
rights-bearers are.  Second, to the extent that some laws are more 
consistent with an approach that views the dead as rights-
killed on the field of battle without a kind hand to hide one’s remains from the eye 
of the world or the gnawing of animals and buzzards.”  DREW GILPIN FAUST, THIS
REPUBLIC OF SUFFERING: DEATH AND THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 63 (2008). 
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holders versus only the living (or vice versa), this may help 
elucidate whose interests lawmakers are trying to protect.  
Third, if one has a view about whether the dead are capable of 
having rights, this will have implications for how one thinks 
laws protecting posthumous bodily integrity should be 
structured. 
The article’s approach is largely positive rather than 
normative.  Although it is my own view that the dead are not 
capable of being rights-bearers, the article’s primary goal is not 
to defend that position but rather to explore the consequences of 
whether they are, or not.  In addition, this is not an article about 
balancing competing rights or interests in the bodies of the dead.  
It is not concerned, for example, with whether individuals 
should be allowed to decline to be organ donors or whether 
displays of plastinated corpses should be banned on the basis 
that they are undignified.  Although the interest in, and legal 
right to, posthumous bodily integrity are central to this article, 
this should in no way be interpreted as suggesting that 
individuals’ wishes regarding their corpses should always be 
respected – either as a moral or a legal matter. 
D. PURPOSE AND DIRECTION OF THIS ARTICLE
The article is structured as follows.  Part II introduces the 
ways in which someone could have an interest in the treatment 
of her corpse.  As noted above, interests can be conceived of as 
terminating on an individual’s death or as surviving death.  Part 
II explores the philosophical basis on which living individuals 
can be conceived of as having legal rights in relation to things 
that happen after their deaths, as well as the basis on which the 
dead can be conceived of as having legal rights. 
Part III examines the moral implications for an interest in 
posthumous bodily integrity when the interest belongs to the 
dead or only to the living.  Specifically, it considers the 
difference the identity of the interest-bearer makes when the 
individual’s prior wishes were express, inferable, or unknown.  
For example, if only the living have a right to posthumous 
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bodily integrity, and enforcement after death simply serves to 
give confidence to other living individuals that their own wishes 
will be carried out, it is easier to justify a policy that treats the 
corpses of those whose wishes are unknowable differently than 
those of deceased people whose prior wishes were known. 
Part IV examines specific laws that grant a right to 
posthumous bodily integrity.  In particular, it discusses laws in 
relation to posthumous organ donation, medical education and 
research using cadavers, the requirement of consent for 
posthumous reproduction, the ability to refuse an autopsy, and 
the ability to choose burial versus cremation. After 
demonstrating that these laws grant a right to posthumous 
bodily integrity, the analysis in Part IV reveals that it matters 
who holds the rights.  Specifically, the weight to be given to 
competing interests often should depend in part on whether the 
dead have an interest in posthumous bodily integrity.  This is 
not a question that appears to have been considered in drafting 
or enacting legislation, and I suggest a change to anatomical gift 
legislation that reflects my own view that the dead cannot have 
rights.  If, however, the dead can have a right to posthumous 
bodily integrity, laws permitting the display of ancient corpses 
are harder to justify. 
II. POSTHUMOUS INTERESTS
A. INTRODUCTION AND TERMINOLOGY
To set the stage for an analysis of a legal right to 
posthumous bodily integrity, it is important to consider on what 
basis there can be rights in relation to dead people’s bodies.  
There is no question that the general public and living family 
members can have legal rights in relation to others’ cadavers 
because they are living people with ongoing interests in the 
treatment of those cadavers.  (Assume for the moment that 
interests ground rights, which will be addressed below.)  Less 
obvious is how a person can have an interest in the treatment of 
her own cadaver.  After all, the person and the cadaver will 
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never coexist, such that it is not obvious why a person has an 
interest in the treatment of her corpse – either before or after her 
death.  The argument might go that I should not have a present 
interest in what happens after my death because I will not be 
around to be affected by those events, and after I am dead I will 
not have an interest in anything because there will not be a “me” 
to have interests at all. 
That said, there are two ways in which such postmortem 
interests can be justified: first, living people are said to have an 
interest in certain events that occur after their deaths because 
they may be part of a person’s overall life plan; and second, 
some construe the dead themselves as having a limited set of 
ongoing interests.  While the first justification is relatively 
uncontroversial, the second is not.  Some deny that the dead 
have sufficient moral status to possess a legal right to 
posthumous bodily integrity and, therefore, should not be 
viewed as having that right.  From this view it follows that the 
previous wishes of the dead can be ignored without violating 
any rights of the dead themselves.  However, respecting the 
wishes of the dead may be desirable insofar as it gives 
confidence to the living that their own wishes will be carried out 
(or for other reasons related to fulfilling the interests of 
surviving family or society as a whole). 
It is important to be clear that the relevant question is not 
one of legal standing or enforcement of the law – the dead have 
no legal standing – but another legal entity, such as the 
deceased’s estate, could conceivably seek to enforce a right to 
posthumous bodily integrity.  For example, one could imagine 
the estate of a deceased person suing to prevent certain medical 
research on a corpse based on the provisions of a deceased’s 
will.  Rather, at issue is the nature of legally-protected interests 
in the treatment of one’s corpse. 
In addition, it is worth noting that the fact that corpses are 
legally protected does not mean that corpses have legal rights 
any more than the fact that heritage buildings are legally 
protected means that those buildings have legal rights.  Whose 
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rights a law protects is a question of who is its subject rather 
than its object; “for whom” the law is enacted rather than “in 
regard to” what.13  The fact that corpses are legally protected is 
therefore not determinative of whether only the living are rights-
holders. 
The question addressed below is what implications flow 
from the view that the law treats the dead as rights-holders 
versus the view that it only treats the living as rights-holders.  
Again, the article is not primarily attempting to answer the 
controversial philosophical question whether the dead are 
capable of being rights-holders.  Rather, it focuses on the 
implications for the law given both approaches. 
B. AN INTERESTS-BASED APPROACH TO RIGHTS
Rights are notoriously difficult to define and are 
conceptualized differently by different scholars.  The various 
approaches, including Hohfeld’s, Hart’s Will Theory (also 
known as Choice Theory), and interest-based theories are 
discussed at length in the jurisprudence literature and this 
article will only address interests-based theories in any detail. 
What is important to note is that some of these theories are 
less easily reconciled with the view that the dead are capable of 
having rights.14  Hart’s Will Theory, for example, requires that 
rights-holders have the ability to make reasoned decisions,15
which would obviously be problematic for the claim that the 
dead can be rights-bearers and would also potentially rule out as 
rights-holders some of the living, such as those in a persistent 
vegetative state.  Other theories, however, view non-humans, 
 13.  Matthew H. Kramer, Do Animals and Dead People Have Legal Rights?, 14
CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 29, 39 (2001). 
 14.  Kirsten Smolensky makes the same point in her own work.  See Kirsten 
Rabe Smolensky, Rights of the Dead, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 763, 769–72 (2009). 
 15.  See Leif Wenar, Rights, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Fall 
2011 ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/rights/ (last reviewed 
Jul. 2, 2011) (outlining a general discussion of Hart’s Will Theory).  See also Kramer,
supra note 13, at 29. 
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animals, and even trees as potential rights-bearers.16  Thus, 
depending on one’s view of the nature and scope of rights, it 
may, or may not, be possible for the dead to have them.  Since 
the aim of this article is not primarily to take a normative 
position as to whether the dead have rights but rather to 
examine what it might mean if they do or do not, I take an 
approach to rights that is compatible with the dead being rights-
bearers, namely an interests-based approach. 
Just as there is no agreement as to the best approach to 
rights, even within an interests-based approach there is no 
agreement as to the precise role of interests in relation to legal 
rights.  What interest theories of rights have in common is the 
view that an entity has a right when others have a duty to 
protect one of its interests.17  Thus, “legal rules conferring rights 
promote the right-holder’s well-being represented by her legal 
interests.”18  Interest theories have been promoted by scholars 
such as Bentham, Raz, Feinberg, and Kramer. 
“Interests” refer to those moral claims of an entity,19 the 
violation of which is a moral wrong, all things being equal.  
Some interests are more deserving of, and may receive more 
legal protection, than others.  There should be overlap between 
interests and legal protections (for example, to deliberately 
injure a person both violates that person’s interest in bodily 
integrity and is contrary to the law), but the overlap will never 
be absolute for several reasons, including the fact that interests 
are neither universally agreed upon nor static.  In addition, 
interests often conflict, such that it is impossible to respect 
everyone’s interests simultaneously. Balancing interests is 
therefore important in lawmaking. 
 16. See, e.g., generally CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, SHOULD TREES HAVE STANDING?
(1996). 
 17.  George W. Rainbolt, Rights Theory, 1 PHIL. COMPASS 11, 11 (2006). 
 18. DANIEL SPERLING, POSTHUMOUS INTERESTS: LEGAL AND ETHICAL 
PERSPECTIVES 71 (2008). 
 19.  For now, I deliberately avoid suggesting that only persons may hold 
interests, since the subject of this inquiry is whether the dead can be interest-
holders.
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Consider two different interests-based approaches to rights.  
Joel Feinberg’s theory is that in order to be capable of having 
legal rights one must be capable of having interests.20  For him, 
to have an interest means to have a stake in something.21
Interests are related to, but narrower than, wants and desires, in 
that only deep-rooted wants can be interests.22  As a result, 
having an interest presupposes having “rudimentary cognitive 
equipment.”23
Matthew Kramer’s approach is broader.  According to him, 
any entity that can benefit, in a general sense, can have interests.  
X has an interest in an event or state of affairs if that “event or 
state of affairs will improve X’s condition or will avert a 
deterioration therein.”24  Unlike Feinberg’s approach, Kramer’s 
does not require that interest-holders have rudimentary 
cognitive equipment.  Therefore, inanimate objects, such as 
buildings, can have interests. 
However, the difference between Feinberg and Kramer’s 
approaches is less than it appears, because whereas Feinberg’s 
interest-holders are capable of being rights holders, only a 
subset of Kramer’s interest-holders is capable of having rights.  
Thus, even though many more entities count as interest-holders 
in Kramer’s approach than in Feinberg’s, many of Kramer’s 
interest-holders are not rights-holders. 
According to Kramer, possessing interests is a necessary but 
insufficient condition for an entity to have the status of a legal 
rights-holder.  The moral status of the entity must be considered, 
and Kramer evaluates the moral status of entities in comparison 
to entities with paradigmatic moral status – namely competent 
adult humans.25  Feinberg takes moral status into consideration 
 20.  Joel Feinberg, The Rights of Animals and Unborn Generations, in RIGHTS,
JUSTICE, AND THE BOUNDS OF LIBERTY 165, 167 (1980) [hereinafter Feinberg Rights]
(outlining the interests principle). 
 21.  Joel Feinberg, Harm and Self-Interest, in RIGHTS, JUSTICE, AND THE BOUNDS 
OF LIBERTY 45, 45 (1980) [hereinafter Feinberg Harm]. 
22.  Id. at 46. 
23.  Feinberg Rights, supra note 20, at 168. 
24. Kramer, supra note 13, at 33. 
25.  Id.
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in determining who is an interests-holder, and considers 
interest-holders to be potential rights-holders, while Kramer 
considers moral status only after status as an interest-holder has 
been established. 
Kramer provides the example of a law that forbids walking 
on the grass.26  According to him, the lawn and perhaps each 
blade of grass have interests, but they do not have legal rights.  
Rather, the holder of rights in the context of this law is the public 
for whose benefit the law is maintained.27  The grass does not 
have legal rights because it is too dissimilar to living people.  
According to Kramer, a rights-holder is someone for whose 
benefit a law is enacted and it does not make sense to think that 
a law forbidding walking on the grass is enacted for the grass’ 
benefit.28  Feinberg’s approach to the same example would 
presumably be that grass does not have interests, because it 
doesn’t have a stake in whether it is trampled or even in whether 
it lives or dies, and therefore the grass cannot have rights.  
According to him, legal rights are a kind of claim against 
someone and only those with interests can have such claims.29
Kramer’s approach can be criticized for taking too broad a 
view of interests.  If “interest” is to have any moral significance, 
then inanimate objects should not be viewed as having interests 
simply because they can be improved or destroyed.  Such an 
approach grants some kind of moral status to almost every 
tangible thing, although not necessarily very much moral status 
and not necessarily the capacity to bear legal rights.  On the 
other hand, Kramer may not intend for interests to have any 
inherent moral significance: the question of moral significance 
may only arise at the stage of determining whether someone (or 
something) is a rights-holder. 
Neither of these interests-based approaches to rights 
requires the ability to enforce those rights oneself.  Nor does the 
 26.  Id. at 36. 
27.  Id.
 28.  Id.
 29.  Feinberg Rights, supra note 20, at 167. 
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nature of what is protected dictate who the rights-holder is: a 
law can protect something without that something being the 
rights-holder, as is the case with lawns and heritage buildings in 
the examples above.  Note also that just because an entity is 
capable of having legal rights does not mean that all laws in 
relation to it necessarily protect its own interests.  For example, 
we can proscribe indignities to a corpse not only to protect the 
deceased’s own interests (assuming for the moment that it can 
have interests), but to protect the public’s interest in the 
dignified treatment of the dead. 
To summarize, according to interest theories of rights, 
having interests is the basis for having legal rights (although 
having interests may not be a sufficient condition for having 
legal rights) and competent human adults are paradigmatic 
rights-holders.  The latter is presumably true of all theories of 
rights, but it is an important aspect of Kramer’s approach to 
creating rights from interests. 
C. INTERESTS OF THE LIVING IN THE TREATMENT OF THEIR 
CORPSE
Given an interests-based approach to rights, living 
individuals can have an interest in what happens to their bodies 
after they die, even though those people will no longer exist at 
the relevant time.  The interests of the living in what will become 
their corpse are what Dworkin calls critical interests.30  He draws 
a distinction between critical and experiential interests: 
experiential interests are those that relate to experience and state 
of mind, while critical interests reflect critical judgments about 
what makes life good.31  The ability to shape our lives according 
to our critical and experiential interests, according to Dworkin, 
is central to the value of autonomy.32  Decisions about our living 
bodies may reflect experiential interests (for example, the desire 
 30.  RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION,
EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 201–02 (1993). 
 31. Id. at 201. 
32.  Id. at 224. 
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to avoid pain) or critical interests (a religious interest in not 
having a medical procedure).  The living can have no 
experiential interests in relation to post-death events, since death 
and experience are mutually exclusive.  However, they may 
have critical interests in relation to such events. 
For example, Donald can have a critical interest in ensuring 
that his family is financially secure during his lifetime but also 
after he is dead.  He may also have a critical interest in 
preserving the environment for future generations.  
Philosophical theorists Allen Buchanan and Dan Brock draw a 
distinction, similar to Dworkin’s, between experiential interests 
and “surviving interests,” which are essentially those critical 
interests that relate to future events.33  They conclude that such 
interests may relate to post-death events.34  Thus, “[w]hat 
happens after death can (depending on the particular person’s 
own idea of self-development) complete the development of the 
self.”35
The existence of critical interests in relation to post-mortem 
events means not only that people care what happens after they 
die, but also that they have a moral claim to determining what 
happens after they die.  Since critical interests implicate our 
autonomy – our interest in making decisions about ourselves  – 
we can have a present interest in post-mortem events.36  These 
post-mortem events can include the treatment of our bodies after 
death.  However, the fact that we have a moral claim does not 
mean that that claim must always be respected or that it must be 
legally protected.  One’s interest in autonomy is not absolute.  
When it comes to organ donation, for example, other entities 
with an interest in the treatment of a corpse include the 
surviving family, potential organ recipients and their families, 
and society at large (which has a stake in promoting health and 
 33.  ALLEN E. BUCHANAN & DAN W. BROCK, DECIDING FOR OTHERS: THE ETHICS 
OF SURROGATE DECISION MAKING 164 (1989). 
 34. Id. at 163. 
 35.  T. M. Wilkinson, Individual and Family Decisions About Organ Donation, 24 J.
APPLIED PHIL. 26, 31 (2007). 
 36. ROBERT M. VEATCH, TRANSPLANTATION ETHICS 146 (2000). 
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in minimizing healthcare costs). 
Living individuals can therefore have critical interests in the 
treatment of their corpses.  These interests can ground legal 
rights.  What is less clear is whether those interests survive 
death, such that the dead themselves can be construed as having 
an interest in their posthumous bodily integrity.  If so, then all 
things being equal, we should carry out the wishes of the dead, 
in part, because doing so respects interests that persist.  But 
assuming for the moment that the only potential interest an 
individual could have in her own corpse is the critical interest of 
the living individual in her future cadaver, that interest would 
end with the individual’s death.  It would follow that there is no 
moral obligation to the deceased to actually carry out an 
individual’s wishes after her death.  Rather, any interest a 
person had in the treatment of her corpse could only be fulfilled 
or violated during her life: individuals’ moral claims in relation 
to their bodies would expire at death. 
Notwithstanding the inability to harm a person’s critical 
interests after her death,37 there may be reasons for respecting 
the prior wishes of the dead even if only the living have 
interests.  If people’s wishes are not actually respected after 
death, two things follow.  First, if a person or the state assures 
another that her body will be treated in a particular way to break 
that promise is immoral, even though it is not a violation of the 
deceased’s interests.38  It is a wrong, but not a wrong to the 
deceased.  (For present purposes I ignore any distinction 
between the morality of an individual breaking a promise versus 
a state breaking a promise.) 
Second, if an individual’s post-mortem wishes are not 
 37.  Those who take the view that the dead have interests may object to the 
assertion that a person’s critical interests cannot be harmed after death.  This 
possibility will be discussed in the following parts.  For now, the assertion can be 
read as meaning that a living person’s critical interests cannot be harmed after 
death because the living person no longer exists.  Whether the dead person assumes 
those interests is, for now, an open question. 
 38.  See generally Elinor Mason, We Make No Promises, 123 PHIL. STUD. 33 
(2005), for a discussion of the morality of breaking promises, including deathbed 
promises. 
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systematically respected, living individuals will have good 
reason to doubt that their own wishes will be respected after 
their death.  Their critical interests in the treatment of their 
corpses can therefore not be satisfied.  Thus, the claim that living 
individuals have an interest in what happens to their corpses 
rests not on interests that survive death, but rather on the benefit 
to them of knowing, while they are alive, that their wishes will 
be respected. 
A living person’s legal right to posthumous bodily integrity 
can therefore be grounded in a critical interest, while alive, in the 
treatment of her corpse.  We care about our corpses because they 
are closely linked to our living bodies, which are central to our 
concepts of ourselves and to our autonomy while alive. 
D. INTERESTS OF THE DEAD IN THE TREATMENT OF THEIR 
CORPSE
The argument above that the living have critical interests in 
the treatment of their future corpse is relatively uncontroversial.  
Much more controversial is the issue of whether those interests 
can survive death.  Phrased differently, the question is whether 
the dead themselves can have interests or rights in the treatment 
of their bodies.  The possibility that the dead have interests 
raises two problems, known as the “experience problem” and 
the “problem of the subject.” 
The experience problem is essentially that because the dead 
have no self-awareness or ability to experience anything, they 
cannot be harmed, they cannot have a stake in anything, and 
their interests while alive can no longer be thwarted.39  (“Harm” 
is used here to mean to set back or not fulfill one’s interests; and, 
the fact that different theorists have different conceptions of 
what counts as an interest should not affect the analysis.)  In 
 39.  See David L. Perry, Ethics and Personhood: Some Issues in Contemporary 
Neurological Science and Technology, SANTA CLARA UNIVERSITY,
http://www.scu.edu/ethics/publications/submitted/Perry/personhood.html (last 
visited May 23, 2013).  Perry’s lecture, found on the Santa Clara webpage, also 
discusses the experience problem. 
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essence, the argument is that the dead no longer have interests 
because of their inability to be harmed.  However, this assumes a 
subjective approach to harm that is itself controversial.  It 
assumes that awareness by the subject of harm is a necessary 
condition for harm: one is only harmed if one knows about the 
harmful event or fact.  If Donald has an interest in the financial 
wellbeing of his children, for example, on a subjective approach 
to harm it is not sufficient that Donald’s children are all poor for 
him to be harmed – he must know that they’re poor.  A number 
of scholars, such as L. W. Sumner, take a subjective approach to 
harm.40  Others are willing to concede an objective approach to 
interests even if they do not ultimately believe the dead can have 
interests.41
Thus, on a subjective approach, it is difficult to conceive of 
the dead as having posthumous legal rights.  If harm to an 
interest requires the harm to be experienced, and the dead are 
incapable of experiencing anything, it follows that the dead are 
incapable of having their interests harmed.  If there is no 
prospect for the violation of an interest, there would seem to be 
no foundation for a legal right to have that interest protected 
within an interest-based theory of rights. 
Some scholars, however, consider harm to be at least 
partially objective.  Although one’s interests, themselves, are 
subjectively determined (by virtue of what specific individuals 
value),42 whether or not those interests have been thwarted (in 
other words, whether one has been harmed) can be determined 
objectively.43  On such an approach, Donald is harmed if he has 
 40.  See generally L. W. SUMNER, WELFARE, HAPPINESS AND ETHICS (1996).  
Sumner’s account is one of welfare rather than harm, but since interests are defined 
in terms of welfare and harm is defined in terms of interests, this poses no problem.  
Sumner is of the view that we are not harmed when our desires are thwarted unless 
we have awareness of the fact.  See id. at 113–37. 
 41.  Ernest Partridge, Posthumous Interests and Posthumous Respect, 91 ETHICS
243, 247 (1981). 
 42.  And even that is controversial.  Some maintain that what is good for us can 
be at least partially determined on an objective basis.  See SUMNER, supra note 40, at 
45–80. 
 43.  See, e.g., Feinberg Harm, supra note 21, at 61, 63. 
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an interest in his children’s financial well-being, and his children 
are poor, regardless of whether Donald knows they are poor. 
Feinberg’s approach to harm is objective.44  He claims that 
we are harmed when our interests are thwarted, regardless of 
whether we are aware of the harm.  For example, Feinberg 
considers libeled people to be harmed even if they are never 
made aware of the harm to their reputations.  An individual is 
harmed if she is the owner of a harmed interest regardless of 
whether she feels harmed.45
Whereas the subjective approach to the experience problem 
made it difficult to conceive of the dead having posthumous 
interests and therefore posthumous rights, such rights are 
clearly possible on an objective approach: by eliminating the 
need for harm to be experienced you eliminate the experience 
problem.  Feinberg concludes that our interests can survive 
death, in part, because they are objective. 
The second and more difficult problem for any theory in 
which the dead have interests is the problem of the subject.  If 
the deceased person no longer exists, and her interests are 
thwarted, we can reasonably ask whose interests have been 
thwarted.  Who has been harmed by events that take place after 
death?  There are several possible approaches to the problem of 
the subject.  One, once held by Feinberg but later rejected by 
him, is to say that what is harmed is the interest itself, not the 
person whose interest it is.46  This is, essentially, to reject the 
need for a subject at all.  The interest can continue to exist when 
the person no longer does: “[w]hen death thwarts an interest, 
the interest is harmed, and the harm can be ascribed to the man 
who is no more, just as his debts can be charged to his estate.”47
Thus, the dead can have rights by virtue of the fact that interests 
exist independent of that of the person whose interests they 
are/were.  Further, those interests can ground rights of the 
 44.  Id. at 63. 
45.  Id. at 61. 
 46.  Id. at 65–68. 
47.  Id. at 64. 
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deceased because of the connection between the interest and the 
person that was. 
Feinberg later rejected this view, however, in favor of the 
ante-mortem person approach, which is similar to George 
Pitcher’s view of posthumous interests.  On the ante-mortem 
person view, the dead retain an interest in those things that 
relate to the important desires that were held by those people 
before they died – the ante-mortem people.48  The dead can be 
harmed if those desires are thwarted after death.  Pitcher 
distinguishes between the post-mortem dead – the mere dust 
that cannot be harmed – and the dead as reflecting the ante-
mortem persons that they were.49
Scholars have criticized theories of posthumous interests 
based on the ante-mortem person and her interests.  In order to 
avoid retroactivity (the person being harmed before the harmful 
event actually occurs), Feinberg and Pitcher’s approach to 
posthumous interests relies on the posthumous harm having 
been a harm all along – the fact that the harm will eventually 
occur means that all along the individual was playing a “losing 
game.”50  Joan Callaghan views this approach as simply 
bolstering the argument that the dead can have no interests.  
According to her, what Feinberg and Pitcher are essentially 
arguing is that the living can be harmed by the fact that their 
wishes will not be fulfilled after death.51
Another approach to the problem of the subject is that of 
Kramer.  Recall that Feinberg required interests-bearers to have 
some kind of cognitive equipment, and so any theory of his in 
relation to posthumous interests would have to address that 
issue.52  Feinberg did so by relying on ante-mortem people who 
 48.  See George Pitcher, The Misfortunes of the Dead, 21 AM. PHIL. Q. 183, 184 
(1984). 
 49.  Id.
 50.  JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS 91 (1984). 
 51.  Joan C. Callahan, On Harming the Dead, 97 ETHICS 341, 345–46 (1987).  For 
more arguments against the dead having interests, see generally Malin Masterton et 
al., Queen Christina’s Moral Claim on the Living: Justification of a Tenacious Moral 
Intuition, 10 MED., HEALTHCARE & PHIL. 321 (2007). 
 52.  See discussion supra Part II.B. 
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had cognitive capacity.  Kramer’s approach, on the other hand, 
does not require subjects to have cognitive capacity in order to 
have interests.53  Rather, subjects must merely have the capacity 
to be affected (without necessarily having awareness or 
experience of the effect) to have interests.  On his view buildings 
and grass can have interests and so, clearly, can the dead. 
However, having interests isn’t sufficient to ground rights 
on Kramer’s view, so whether the dead can have posthumous 
rights depends on the moral significance of their interests.  That, 
in turn, is based on the morally relevant resemblance between 
the subject and competent adult humans.54  In his article Do 
Animals and Dead People Have Legal Rights, Kramer concludes that 
the dead can have legal rights if we “subsume the aftermath of 
each dead person’s life within the overall course of his or her 
existence”.55  If we consider the ways in which the dead continue 
to influence the living – through their possessions and their 
persistence in people’s memories, for example – we can conceive 
of them as still having an existence, and therefore as being 
sufficiently analogous to competent adult humans and capable 
of having rights.  On this view, the subject of posthumous 
interests is the dead, but only insofar as the dead have continued 
existence in the lives of living people. 
The nature of the subject of posthumous interests has 
significant implications for the scope and nature of those 
interests and the resulting rights.  One thing that seems to follow 
from all approaches to the subject of posthumous interests is that 
those interests are a subset of the interests held by the living 
person before her death.  I am aware of no theory that grants 
interests to the deceased based on factors other than the interests 
of the living individuals they used to be.  However, no theory 
holds that a deceased’s posthumous interests are identical to the 
interests the living person held while alive.  For example, no one 
contests that experiential interests, such as the interest in 
 53.  See discussion supra Part II.B. 
54. Kramer, supra note 13, at 32, 35. 
55.  Id. at 47. 
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avoiding pain, are extinguished by death. 
Although theories of posthumous interests have in common 
the fact that posthumous interests are a subset of the former 
living person’s interests, the scope of posthumous interests 
varies.  Consider, for example, whether a particular interest of a 
living person needs to be communicated to others in order for it 
to survive as a posthumous interest.  On the ante-mortem person 
approach advocated by Pitcher and Feinberg, there is no reason 
to think an interest must be communicated to survive.  Since the 
subject of posthumous interests is the ante-mortem person, the 
relevant interests are those of the ante-mortem person.  There is 
no need to tie the subject of posthumous interests to people’s 
recollection of that person.  Thus, there is no reason to think that 
one’s interests had to have been communicated before death in 
order for the relevant posthumous interests to exist any more 
than an incompetent patient’s desires before incompetence have 
to be expressed in order for the patient to retain an interest in 
treatment that reflects those wishes.  Rather, as long as the 
interest is still capable of being fulfilled or thwarted, it persists.56
Kirsten Smolensky, on the other hand, who takes Kramer’s 
approach to posthumous interests, limits posthumous interests 
to those that the deceased expressed to others before her death.57
According to Smolensky, whether an interest survives death 
depends on whether there is a record of the desire underlying 
the interest.58  As a result, a secret desire reflects an interest that 
dies with the person who held it. 
Smolensky’s requirement that the living know about an 
interest of the deceased for it to survive follows from Kramer’s 
view that the dead continue to be rights-bearers only to the 
extent that they live on in the memories of the living.59  If this is 
so, then an individual’s desires unknown to others cannot 
survive death to become posthumous interests.  It would also 
56.  Feinberg Harm, supra note 21, at 64. 
 57.  Smolensky, supra note 14, at 772. 
58.  Id. 
 59.  Id. at 790 (citing Kramer, supra note 13, at 47). 
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follow that those who had no friends, family, possessions, 
acquaintances, or celebrity would have no posthumous interests 
and that those who were more guarded and private may have 
fewer posthumous interests than those who were less so. 
Whether posthumous interests exist only in relation to 
expressed desires will have implications for whether the dead 
can have an interest in certain treatment of their corpse in the 
absence of expressed wishes.  For example, as will become more 
apparent below, the issue has implications for whether, under 
existing law, we should presume consent to organ donation 
where the wishes of the living person are unknown.
Having examined the problem of experience and the 
problem of the subject, there is no agreement as to whether the 
dead can have interests or be rights-holders.  Even if we accept 
that the dead can have rights, the scope of those rights is the 
subject of debate.  My own view is that harm is subjective and in 
any event one must have the capacity to be affected (not just 
altered) in order to be the proper subject of rights.  In my view, 
an important feature of death is that it precludes any further 
harm or benefit to the deceased.  However, my aim is not to 
convince the reader of the correctness of my view: the debate on 
whether the dead can have interests that ground rights has been 
discussed for decades in the literature and I make no new 
arguments to add in defense of my view that they cannot.  What 
is important for present purposes is to recognize that there are 
multiple approaches to whether, and how, the dead can be 
conceived of as rights-bearers. 
III. MORAL IMPLICATIONS OF WHETHER AN INTEREST IN 
POSTHUMOUS BODILY INTEGRITY BELONGS TO THE DEAD 
OR ONLY TO THE LIVING
This Part examines the moral implications of viewing a right to 
posthumous bodily integrity as belonging either only to living 
individuals in relation to their own bodies or also to the dead.  
Specifically, it considers the implication in three scenarios in 
which a claim to posthumous bodily integrity could arise: a) 
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where an individual’s wishes regarding her corpse were 
expressed before her death; b) where her wishes were not 
expressed but can be inferred; and c) where her wishes are 
neither expressed nor inferable.  For the moment the analysis 
assumes a generic right to posthumous bodily integrity, 
although this should be viewed as a placeholder for the sum of 
legally-granted rights to make specific decisions about the 
treatment of one’s dead body.  These specific interests will be 
examined in the next Part.  The analysis reveals that the moral 
basis for a right to bodily integrity varies considerably 
depending on whether the underlying interests are construed as 
surviving death or not.  And in some cases, the different 
approaches suggest different morally-acceptable conduct in 
relation to dead bodies. 
A. PRIOR WISHES EXPLICITLY EXPRESSED
Assume an individual, Sara, made it known that she wished 
to be cremated and not to be an organ donor.  Assume also that 
these were her sincere wishes and that Sara is a competent adult.  
Regardless of whether Sara’s critical interests in not being an 
organ donor and in being cremated survive her death, the moral 
thing to do appears to be to respect those wishes, but the reasons 
for this differ considerably depending on whose interests are at 
stake.  If these interests of Sara’s survive death, then to fail to 
abide by them is to harm the deceased Sara’s critical interests.  
To be more precise, those critical interests survive on both a 
Feinberg and Kramer-style approach to posthumous interests.  
On Feinberg’s account, interests need not be known to others in 
order to survive.60  On Kramer’s account, they do need to be 
known to others,61 but this section assumes that Sara’s wishes 
have, in fact, been explicitly communicated. 
If, however, Sara’s interests cease to exist when she dies, 
any morality-based reasons for respecting Sara’s wishes depend 
 60.  See discussion supra Parts II.B. & D. 
 61.  See id.
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on the existence of promises or the knowledge of others that her 
wishes were not respected. 
If Sara’s wishes were expressed in a legally binding manner, 
the state has given Sara reason to believe that her wishes will be 
respected.  This amounts to a kind of promise by the state, 
although equating laws with state promises is perhaps too 
simplistic.  The idea of state promises is also subject to the caveat 
that some laws grant only negative rights.  For example, there is 
no positive right to be an organ donor – the state never promises 
that one’s consent will result in donation – but there is a right 
not to be an organ donor. 
If Sara’s wishes were not expressed in a legally binding 
manner but were nevertheless explicit, the surviving family may 
have explicitly or implicitly promised Sara that they would 
ensure her wishes would be carried out.  If so, and her wishes 
are ultimately not respected, this amounts to a broken promise 
by the family.  From the perspective of broken promises, it may 
be immoral to ignore Sara’s wishes if a promise was made to 
respect them.  This is true regardless of whether Sara’s interests 
survive death.  Assuming that breaking promises is wrong even 
if it does not harm the person to whom the promise was made,62
it is not necessary for Sara to still have interests in order for a 
broken promise to her to be immoral. 
There is another perspective from which it may be immoral 
to ignore Sara’s express wishes, but it only applies in relation to 
the interests of living individuals in the treatment of their own 
corpses.  Since a living person can have critical interests in the 
treatment of her corpse, those interests can only be fulfilled 
during life if the person believes her wishes will be respected.63
 62.  See generally Mason, supra note 38 (discussing four philosophical views on 
the implications and act of promising). 
 63.  The issue is somewhat more complicated in that it depends whether one 
takes a subjective or objective approach to interests.  On Feinberg’s view, whether 
one thinks one’s interest is fulfilled or thwarted is irrelevant to whether that interest 
is actually fulfilled.  To avoid this problem, it is sufficient to recognize that the 
living have not only an interest in the treatment of their corpse, but an interest in 
believing their corpse will be treated in a certain way.  People can, certainly, suffer 
from the belief that their posthumous wishes will not be respected, even if they 
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Thus, by systematically ignoring people’s wishes regarding their 
corpses, the living will have no comfort that their own wishes 
will be respected. 
There is, therefore, an interesting distinction between the 
living and the dead as interest-holders in this respect.  Not 
following Sara’s prior wishes regarding a critical posthumous 
interest harms the dead Sara if, indeed, the dead Sara can have 
interests.  However, if the dead Sara has no interests, not 
following her wishes does not harm her.  The failure to abide by 
her wishes can only constitute harm insofar as it amounts to a 
broken promise or causes other living people to doubt that their 
own wishes will be respected.  One implication of this is that if 
no one knows Sara’s wishes were not respected, and her 
interests terminate at death, it may be morally unproblematic 
not to respect her express wishes unless a promise to her was 
broken.  Thus, if Sara mentioned to her children that she did not 
want to be an organ donor, but she never expressed those 
wishes in a legally binding manner, her children did not 
explicitly or implicitly promise their mother they would carry 
out her wishes, and no one else knows what Sara wanted, there 
may be no moral obligation to fulfill Sara’s wishes. 
That said, there might be a broader dignitary interest in 
carrying out the wishes of the dead.  That is, there may be 
dignitary harm to society as a whole in not respecting the prior 
wishes of the dead even if the fact of not respecting those wishes 
is never made public and no promises were made.  This relates 
to the possibility mentioned in the introduction that society has 
an interest in seeing itself in a certain light – as people who 
respect the wishes of the dead.  Thus, it may be morally wrong 
not to respect the express wishes of the dead, regardless of 
promises and the public’s knowledge, if society is harmed by 
acts of refusing to honor the wishes of the dead.  However, the 
reasons why society would be harmed by such acts depend on 
why society thinks it important to respect the wishes of the dead 
ultimately are. 
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in the first place.  These reasons could include wanting to give 
confidence to the living that their wishes will be respected (in 
which case the refusal would have to be public knowledge to 
affect the interest), believing that the dead have ongoing 
interests (in which case the refusal would not have to be public 
knowledge to affect the interest), wanting to show respect for 
the person that was, or for any number of other reasons.  
However, since this article is primarily concerned with the 
interests of living and dead individuals in relation to their own 
bodies rather than societal interests in the treatment of corpses, it 
does not pursue further the nature of society’s interests in the 
treatment of the dead. 
B. PRIOR WISHES NOT EXPLICITLY EXPRESSED BUT PERHAPS 
INFERABLE
This section considers the implications of the identity of the 
rights-holder for situations in which the deceased did not 
explicitly make her wishes known, but where there are 
surviving friends and family who knew the deceased, or there 
are known facts about the deceased that could lead to inferences 
about what her wishes would have been. 
Imagine that Sara left no explicit instructions but has 
surviving friends and family, or she has known affiliations, such 
as a religious affiliation, from which wishes regarding the 
treatment of her corpse could be inferred.  There are several 
logical possibilities for how to proceed.  For example, we could 
attempt to infer what Sara would have wanted based on the 
values and beliefs we attribute to her, we could simply leave the 
decision to Sara’s family, the state could make whatever 
reasonable and dignified use of Sara’s body it wished, or the 
state could mandate as little interference as possible with the 
body.
If the dead Sara continues to have an interest in 
posthumous bodily integrity, there are two possible ways to 
fulfill that interest.  The first is to try to infer what Sara would 
have wanted based on her personality, beliefs, and values.  In 
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other words, surviving loved ones could enter into a process of 
substitute decision-making not unlike that found in the medical 
context in relation to incompetent patients.64
The second way to fulfill Sara’s posthumous bodily 
integrity is to interfere as little as possible with Sara’s corpse.  
Surviving friends and family may not be in the best position to 
make a substitute decision, either because they may not have a 
good sense of what Sara would have wanted, or because they 
may be in a conflict of interest with the deceased if Sara and her 
family wanted different things for Sara’s body.  In the medical 
context the default is non-interference without consent because 
non-consensual interferences with the bodily integrity of the 
living are considered to be potentially significant violations of 
individual autonomy.65  Thus, in the absence of known wishes, 
the preferable course of action may be to permit as few 
interferences with a corpse as possible by, for example, 
prohibiting organ donation and medical research or education.  
Of course a body must be disposed of in some manner.  If Sara’s 
wishes cannot be inferred, either burial or cremation, the two 
most common and accepted means of disposal, would seem 
appropriate. 
That said, a right to posthumous bodily integrity exists for 
different reasons than the right to bodily integrity while alive: it 
can only protect critical interests, not experiential ones.  As a 
result, the balancing of the deceased’s interests against the 
interests of others in the treatment of the deceased’s body need 
not lead to the same outcome in relation to dead bodies as live 
ones.  If the interest in posthumous bodily integrity is seen as 
less compelling than the interests in bodily integrity of the living 
 64.   See generally Thomas G. Gutheil & Paul S. Applebaum, Substituted 
Judgment: Best Interests in Disguise, 13 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 8 (1983), for a discussion 
and history of the various tests used in substituted decision-making for 
incompetents. 
 65.  In fact, informed consent must accompany, practically, every procedure.  
Informed Consent, AM. MED. ASS’N, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-
resources/legal-topics/patient-physician-relationship-topics/informed-consent.page 
(last visited May 23, 2013).  This is because the medical and legal fields view 
unwanted touching as battery.  See discussion supra Part I.C. 
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(perhaps because of the lack of experiential interests), an 
argument could be made for setting different defaults for the 
dead than for the living.  For example, all dignified interferences 
with a corpse could be allowed unless one opts out.  That might 
encourage people to make an active decision about organ 
donation, for example.  Alternately, the default could reflect 
what a majority of people would choose to do if they addressed 
the issue.66  In the organ donation context, at least, it is well 
established that most people would consent to being donors, 
even though most people do not legally register any 
preference.67  This fact, combined with the benefit to recipients of 
an opt-out default, could be argued to justify an opt-out 
approach to organ donation.  The point is that a default of non-
interference in the absence of consent, while appropriate in 
relation to living bodies, is less obviously appropriate in relation 
to dead bodies even if the dead have ongoing interests. 
The above analysis is oversimplified in that it assumes a 
Feinberg/Pitcher rather than a Kramer approach to the interests 
of the dead.  On Feinberg and Pitcher’s theories, an individual’s 
interests would seem to survive death regardless of whether the 
content of those interests was known to others.68  According to 
Kramer, however, only Sara’s desires that are reflected in what 
others knew about Sara survive death.  Based on the latter 
approach, it is unclear whether friends and family should 
undertake to infer what Sara would have wanted because it is 
not clear whether the dead Sara retains an interest in desires that 
might be inferable but were never expressed.  To the extent the 
interests of the dead relate to the way the dead live on in the 
memories of the living, those interests can perhaps be met so 
long as surviving family and friends think they are doing what 
 66.  See Glenn Cohen, The Right Not to be a Genetic Parent?, 81 S. CAL. L. REV.
1115, 1187–96 (2008), for a discussion of why certain kinds of defaults may be 
performed. 
67.  Survey Shows Many Want to Donate Organs, But Few Do, U.S. NEWS HEALTH 
DAY (Apr. 16, 2009), http://health.usnews.com/health-news/managing-your-
healthcare/articles/2009/04/16/survey-shows-many-want-to-donate-organs-but-few-
do. 
 68.  See discussion supra Part II. 
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the individual would have wanted.  For example, Sara’s interests 
would be met under Kramer’s approach, but not under 
Feinberg’s, by burying her with her husband if she had a secret 
true love with whom she would rather have been buried.  
Whether or not, and to what extent, family members should try 
to infer the deceased’s prior wishes should then, perhaps, 
depend on the degree to which the family members have 
confidence in their ability to infer those wishes. 
If, on the other hand, Sara no longer has an interest in 
bodily integrity and the interests and rights at stake are only 
those of other living individuals in the future treatment of their 
own cadavers, the actions one should take in relation to 
unexpressed wishes are sometimes different.  It may be 
appropriate for friends and family to try to infer the deceased’s 
prior wishes.  The reason for this, however, is to give confidence 
to living individuals that their own families will make decisions 
that reflect those individuals’ beliefs and values. 
It is less obvious in the context of unexpressed wishes, 
however, that we should seek to infer Sara’s prior wishes in 
order to give confidence to the living that their own wishes will 
be respected.  People will not necessarily have confidence that 
unexpressed wishes will be inferred and respected.  In addition, 
those who do not express particular wishes regarding the 
treatment of their dead bodies may not have critical interests in 
the treatment of their corpse one way or another.  Yet, one 
should be careful not to assume a person had no critical interests 
regarding the treatment of her corpse just because no wishes 
were expressed.  One’s posthumous interests are deeply 
personal, and conversations about the treatment and disposal of 
dead bodies are often considered upsetting, morbid, or taboo.  
There are, therefore, many reasons why such matters may not 
explicitly be discussed before death. 
If Sara expressed no wishes because she had no critical 
interests, then there is no need to try to infer what she would 
have wanted if her interests terminated on her death.  However, 
even if Sara did have unexpressed critical interests, she is now 
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dead and has no interests.  The goal of assuring the living that 
their wishes will be respected is not jeopardized because we 
have not ignored Sara’s wishes – we simply do not know what 
they were.  The implication of this is that if interests belong only 
to the living, it does not matter – from the perspective of an 
interest in posthumous bodily integrity – what is done to the 
corpse (within reason, as discussed below).  The family’s own 
wishes could prevail, or the law could mandate doing nothing or 
donating organs without the individual’s prior consent.  None of 
these actions could violate the interests of the interest-holder, 
because she no longer exists.  Nor are these actions harmful to 
the critical interests of the living in the treatment of their own 
corpses if no promises were broken and people’s belief that their 
own wishes will be respected is not obviously threatened. 
Nothing in the foregoing precludes next of kin from trying 
to guess what the person would have wanted and making their 
decision on that basis.  But if only the living have interests, that 
decision only respects the next of kin’s own interests in the 
treatment of a loved one’s body and not those of the deceased or 
of a living person in relation to her own future corpse. 
C. PRIOR WISHES UNKNOWN
Now imagine that Sara has died without expressing her 
wishes regarding the treatment of her corpse and she has no 
surviving friends or family to make a substitute decision based 
on her inferred wishes.  Further, she had no known affiliations 
from which her wishes could be inferred.  In this case, respecting 
the interests of the dead in posthumous bodily integrity may 
require doing as little as possible to Sara’s corpse.  She will be 
harmed by interferences with her corpse that she would not 
have agreed to; and so, like in the medical context, the default 
should be not to touch her body any more than necessary 
without consent.69  Again, however, the distinction between 
 69.  Although, see discussion supra Part II, for a discussion of balancing those 
interests in setting defaults. 
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Feinberg and Kramer’s approaches complicates matters 
somewhat.  Under Kramer’s view, a deceased person with no 
surviving friends or family generally has no posthumous 
interests.70  Therefore the conclusion that we should interfere as 
little as possible with Sara’s corpse applies only to a 
Feinberg/Pitcher approach to posthumous interests. 
If, however, Sara’s interests in the treatment of her corpse 
terminate on her death, it should be permissible to do almost 
anything with her body without violating an interest in 
posthumous bodily integrity.  This does not mean that others’ 
interests cannot be affected: undignified treatment of a corpse, 
for example, may harm the interests of surviving friends and 
family as well as society at large, which has an interest in the 
dignified treatment of human remains.  The point is that the 
interests of a living individual in her own posthumous bodily 
integrity cannot be affected by what is done to her own corpse.  
If the dead have no interests and the right to posthumous bodily 
integrity therefore belongs only to living individuals, the 
individual whose corpse is at issue has no interests or rights to 
be violated after her death.  The interests of other living people 
in their own posthumous bodily integrity are also arguably not 
threatened by, for example, taking the organs of those whose 
prior wishes are unknowable, because the living can avoid this 
fate by expressing their wishes to others, especially in a legally 
binding format. 
The ability to do almost anything to the corpse of someone 
whose wishes are unknown, without affecting an interest in 
posthumous bodily integrity, is perhaps the most significant 
difference between viewing an interest in posthumous bodily 
integrity as belonging only to living individuals versus 
persisting after death. 
Note the qualification above – one may do almost anything 
without affecting a posthumous interest in bodily integrity.  This 
limitation relates to unusual, and therefore unpredictable, 
 70.  See discussion supra Part II. 
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treatment of a corpse, exemplified here by cryonic preservation 
and plastination for the purposes of public display. 
If only living people have an interest in their own 
posthumous bodily integrity, it may, nevertheless, be 
inappropriate to permit unusual interferences with a corpse in 
the absence of expressed or inferable wishes.  There are two 
reasons for this.  First, because these practices are very unusual, 
most people would not think to express an opinion about them.  
Second, and relatedly, these practices are unusual in part 
because most people do not want their bodies treated in this 
way: they do not want to be cryonically frozen or put on display. 
Whereas the first reason suggests that people have formed 
opinions that they simply do not express, the second is 
consistent with the possibility that an individual never formed 
an opinion, while alive, about a particular treatment of his or her 
corpse.  This would fall under the category of wishes not 
expressed and not inferable, but there may be a moral 
distinction between acting in a manner the deceased might have 
actually opposed while alive, although we have no way of 
knowing of that opposition now, and acting in a manner the 
deceased never contemplated.  In other words, it may be worse 
to cryonically freeze someone who, while alive, thought the idea 
repulsive but left no clue of that view to others after her death, 
than to do the same to someone who never turned her mind to 
the possibility while alive. 
My intuition is that the former is only worse than the latter 
if one thinks that the dead have a right to posthumous bodily 
integrity on a Feinberg-type basis.  If all interests end with 
death, or if the dead have interests only to the extent they are 
remembered by the living, then there is no greater harm to the 
dead in going against a person’s existing but unexpressed and 
unknown wishes than there is in doing something that the 
deceased had no opinion on in life but might have opposed had 
she considered the options.  Only if the dead have ongoing 
interests that are not dependent on what the living know about 
them is the possibility of a moral difference plausible.  Then I 
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believe a reasonable argument could be made that it is morally 
worse to violate interests held but not communicated than to act 
in a manner that might have been contrary to the person’s 
wishes had she contemplated the issue. 
The point of limiting unusual or unpopular uses of corpses 
to situations in which there is actual prior consent is that if we 
imposed such uses in the absence of expressed wishes living 
people might not have their critical interests in the treatment of 
their bodies satisfied.  They might worry that anything not 
expressly mentioned before death would be fair game and 
might, therefore, worry about the fate of their remains. 
It is highly unlikely that families or the state would want to 
donate people’s corpses for such procedures without knowing it 
was what the deceased wanted.  But the point is that if an 
interest in posthumous bodily integrity belonged only to the 
living we could act morally – at least in relation to the interests 
of living people in their own bodies71 – by either burying or 
cremating the bodies of those who expressed no view before 
death and whose wishes were not inferable, but not by 
displaying those people’s corpses in Body Worlds.  This is 
because burial and cremation are both sufficiently well known 
and acceptable to most of the population – there is no harm done 
to the critical interests of the living by making, say, cremation, 
the default for those who expressed no views while alive.  
Neither of these things is true of less frequent interferences such 
as plastination and cryonic preservation: they are both little 
known and much less popular.  Organ donation presumably 
falls somewhere in between, in that most people express a 
willingness to donate but there are significant numbers of 
people who do not want to be donors, and donation is still 
relatively rare. 
 71.  It is still arguable that there is harm to society at large, based on human 
dignity, if we allow organ donation by those who didn’t affirmatively express a 
wish to be donors.  Alternately, of course, is the argument that potential organ 
recipients have interests that should trump any individual’s interest in deciding 
what will become of her cadaver.  Recall, however, that the focus of this article is 
the right to posthumous bodily integrity in relation to one’s own body. 
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IV. A LEGAL RIGHT TO POSTHUMOUS BODILY INTEGRITY
Part II demonstrated how the living and the dead can, at least in 
theory, have interests in relation to posthumous events and how 
these interests can ground legal rights in relation to what 
happens after death.  Part III demonstrated some of the moral 
implications that flow from viewing an interest in posthumous 
bodily integrity as belonging to the dead or only to living 
individuals.  With this foundation in place, Part IV considers 
specific types of decisions that can be made about one’s corpse 
and examines how existing laws reflect the analysis in Part III.  
That is, it examines whether existing laws reflect a view that the 
dead have an interest in posthumous bodily integrity or a view 
that only the living do.  It also considers how laws might be 
changed to reflect one view or the other. 
Recall why it is that (living or dead) individuals may have 
interests in relation to their cadavers.  Essentially, most people 
care, to varying degrees, what happens to their bodies after they 
die.  Many have a strong preference for burial or cremation (and 
spend considerable sums on solid wood caskets or decorative 
urns); some want to be organ donors, while others wish to be 
interred intact, and therefore wish to avoid not only organ 
donation but autopsy, if possible.  These wishes may reflect 
critical interests in following the tenets of one’s religion, in being 
altruistic, or in any number of views about the good life.  And 
so, we have enacted laws to protect these interests. 
The laws discussed below grant rights to posthumous 
bodily integrity in relation to individuals’ own corpses.  These 
laws in no way deny, and often affirm, that others will also have 
an interest in the treatment of that corpse.  For example, 
surviving friends and family can be harmed by the careless 
treatment of a loved one’s remains, or by having a loved one’s 
organs removed for transplantation if that is disturbing to 
surviving family members.  In addition, society has an interest 
in ensuring that human remains are treated with dignity.  It 
may, therefore, be evident that people should treat human 
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corpses with respect, but it does not follow from that premise 
that there should be a right to bodily integrity in relation to one’s 
own dead body.  A right to posthumous bodily integrity means 
not only that certain interferences are not allowed, but that it’s 
the entity whose body is at issue whose rights stand to be 
violated.  Thus, laws that respect a right to posthumous bodily 
integrity must be distinguished from laws that protect corpses 
from interference but do not treat the (living or dead) person 
whose corpse is at stake as the rights-holder. 
For example, many U.S. states criminalize certain acts in 
relation to a corpse on the basis that they are undignified.  
Necrophilia is commonly prohibited, either expressly or 
implicitly.72  It is a criminal act regardless of whether a person 
consents in advance to having her dead body used in this way.73
Other laws require dignified disposal of corpses in certain 
prescribed locations that will avoid possible threats to public 
health.74  These reflect both society’s interest in the dignified 
treatment of corpses and its interest in disposing of corpses in a 
manner that protects the well-being of the living.  Of course 
necrophilia and undignified disposal could also harm the loved 
ones of the deceased.  The point is not that necrophilia only 
harms the general public but rather that it is harmful regardless 
of whether it can be said to be harmful to the deceased.  The 
prohibition on necrophilia and the requirement of a dignified 
disposal are therefore not primarily concerned with posthumous 
bodily integrity. 
The right to posthumous bodily integrity is reflected in laws 
that require an individual’s consent for most expected (and 
some unexpected) interferences with a corpse.  The consent 
 72.  See, e.g., 2012 NEV. STAT. 201.450 (“A person who commits a sexual 
penetration on the dead body of a human being is guilty of a category A felony . . . 
.”).
 73.  It may seem unlikely that someone would provide advance consent to 
necrophilia, but there are many people who consider their corpses to be no more 
than tissue and would conceivably consent to necrophilia.  Regardless, the point is 
that such consent would be legally irrelevant. 
 74.  See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 144, § 35 (2012) (prohibiting burial near a 
water supply). 
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required is preferably the advanced consent of the person whose 
deceased body is at issue.  The substitute consent of the next of 
kin or executor may suffice, but only in the absence of the 
advance consent of the deceased.  In other words, these laws 
grant individuals a legal right to make binding decisions about 
the treatment of their bodies after death.  In particular, laws 
governing organ donation, medical education and research on 
cadavers, choosing burial or cremation, and posthumous 
reproduction reflect an interest in posthumous bodily integrity. 
A. ORGAN DONATION
The discussion of organ donation first demonstrates that 
organ donation laws grant a right to posthumous bodily 
integrity and then considers whether that right belongs only to 
the living, or also to the dead.  Put another way, it examines the 
implications for organ donation policy of whether the right not 
to be an organ donor survives death. 
All U.S. states have adopted some version of the Uniform 
Anatomical Gift Act, the majority of which have adopted the 
2006 version (hereinafter referred to as the UAGA).75  The 
UAGA grants competent adults the legal right to decide whether 
or not to be posthumous organ donors.76  The default under the 
UAGA is that no organ donation will occur.77  Consent is 
required to displace that default.78  In other words, the UAGA 
reflects an opt-in approach to organ donation, which is the case 
in all common law countries but not in many civil law countries, 
where the default is to allow donation unless a donor or her next 
of kin has expressed a wish not to be an organ donor. 
Section 4 of the UAGA states: “an anatomical gift of a 
donor’s body or part may be made during the life of the donor 
 75.  Acts: Anatomical Gift Act (2006), UNIF. L. COMM’N,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Anatomical%20Gift%20Act%20(2006) 
(last visited May 17, 2013).  
 76.  U.A.G.A. § 4 (2008).   
 77.  U.A.G.A. §§ 4–5 (2008).   
 78.  U.A.G.A. § 5 (2008).   
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for the purpose of transplantation, therapy, research, or 
education . . . .”79  Consent to donating one’s organs may be 
given in a will, in a signed organ donor card, or orally.80  An 
individual may choose to donate all or only certain parts of her 
body, at her discretion.81  She may also withdraw consent at any 
time before death.82
The UAGA provides not only for consent but also for 
legally binding refusals to consent.83  Although refusal is 
presumed, where the deceased did not consent or refuse in a 
legally recognized manner, family members, in a hierarchy set 
out by the UAGA, may decide whether to donate their relative’s 
organs.84  Refusing to donate, as opposed to not deciding 
whether to donate, means that the family has no legal authority 
to consent to donation on the deceased’s behalf.85
Notwithstanding that the UAGA clearly grants priority in 
decision-making to the individual potential donor, there is a 
well-documented practice of medical staff adhering to the 
wishes of surviving family members to refuse donation even if 
the deceased previously consented.  In practice, even where an 
individual has given her legally binding consent to being an 
organ donor, organs will not be retrieved in the face of 
opposition by the family.  This is known as the family veto.86
In response to the family veto, the 2006 version of the 
UAGA makes explicit that the law grants the decision to donate 
first to the individual potential donor and not the surviving 
 79.  U.A.G.A. § 4 (2008).   
 80. U.A.G.A. §§ 5, 10 (2008).   
81. U.A.G.A. § 4 (2008).   
 82. U.A.G.A. § 6 (2008).   
83. U.A.G.A. § 7 (2008).   
 84.  U.A.G.A. § 9 (2008).   
 85.  U.A.G.A. § 7(d) (2008).   
 86.  For description and discussion of the family veto, see Jennifer L. Mesich-
Brant & Lawrence J. Grossback, Assisting Altruism: Evaluating Legally Binding 
Consent in Organ Donation Policy, 30 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 687 (2005); 
Wilkinson, supra note 35, at 87–88; T. M. Wilkinson, Individual and Family Decisions 
About Organ Donation, 24 J. APPLIED PHIL. 26 (2007); and Paula Boddington, Organ 
Donation After Death – Should I Decide, or Should My Family?,15 J. APPLIED PHIL. 69 
(1998). 
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family: “[I]n the absence of an express, contrary indication by 
the donor, a person other than the donor is barred from making, 
amending, or revoking an anatomical gift of a donor’s body or 
part if the donor made an anatomical gift of the donor’s body or 
part . . . .”87  The family may only consent to donation of the 
deceased’s body or refuse to consent if the deceased did not 
legally consent or refuse consent while alive.  There is no 
positive right to be a donor, in that there may be no usable 
organs or viable recipient, but there is effectively a right not to 
have your wishes overridden by your next of kin. 
The provisions of the UAGA, therefore, largely mirror the 
law with regard to consent to medical treatment.88  The 
“patient,” if competent, has the right to consent; and, in the 
absence of consent, donation is legally impermissible.  
Alternatively, if the “patient” did not make her wishes known 
before becoming incompetent, a family member may provide 
substitute consent. 
One potential difference between the law of substitute 
consent to medical decisions and the family’s authority to 
consent under the UAGA relates to the basis on which the 
substitute decision must be made.  In relation to incompetent 
patients, substitute decisions regarding medical treatment 
should, generally, be based on what the patients would have 
wanted for themselves or, alternately, in the patients’ best 
interests.89  Incompetence does not change the fact that the 
patient’s interests are given priority.  The UAGA, on the other 
hand, does not require the family to base its decision on what 
 87.  U.A.G.A. § 8 (2008).   
 88.  See discussion supra Part III. 
 89.  Many states have statutorily adopted a substitute decision standard – at 
least for certain types of treatment decisions.  In Illinois, for example, the Health 
Care Surrogate Act states that treatment decisions for an incompetent patient 
should “conform[] as closely as possible to what the patient would have done or 
intended under the circumstances.” Health Care Surrogate Act, 755 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 40/20 (2007).  For a discussion of the substitute judgment standard and how 
courts have adopted it, see ROBERT S. OLICK, TAKING ADVANCE DIRECTIVES 
SERIOUSLY: PROSPECTIVE AUTONOMY AND DECISIONS NEAR THE END OF LIFE 5–9 
(2001). 
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they think the deceased would have wanted.90  However, the 
decision is not left entirely to their discretion.  Some states’ laws 
indicate that if it is known that the deceased would have 
opposed donation, the next of kin may not consent to it, even if 
the deceased’s opposition was not expressed in a legally binding 
manner.91
Another difference between the medical context and the 
organ donation context relates to the existence of the family 
veto, which suggests that the right to posthumous bodily 
integrity regarding organ donation may, de facto, be weaker than 
it appears on the face of the law.  There is no analogy to the 
family veto regarding incompetent patients: I am aware of no 
significant practice of rejecting patients’ legally valid and clear 
advance directives in the face of opposition by family 
members.92
Organ donation law, therefore, provides an example of a 
legal right to posthumous bodily integrity.  It makes the default 
that no donation can occur without consent, and prioritizes the 
individual’s consent over that of the family.  This need not be so: 
 90.  U.A.G.A. § 8 (2008).   
 91.  See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4301 (McKinney 2007).
(Any of the following persons, in the order of priority stated, may . . . in 
the absence of actual notice of contrary indications by the decedent . . . or 
reason to believe that an anatomical gift is contrary to the decedent's 
religious or moral beliefs, give all or any part of the decedent's  body for 
any purpose specified . . . .). 
See also Illinois Anatomical Gift Act, 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/5-5(b) (2007) (“If 
no gift has been executed under subsection (a), any of the following persons . . . and 
in the absence of (i) actual notice of contrary intentions by the decedent . . . may consent 
. . . .”); and Illinois Anatomical Gift Act, 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/5-20(c) (2007) 
(If (1) the hospital . . . has actual notice of opposition to the gift by the 
decedent . . . or (2) there is reason to believe that an anatomical gift is 
contrary to the decedent's religious beliefs . . . then the gift of all or any 
part of the decedent's body shall not be requested.). 
 92.  Advance directives, and other instructions that precede incapacity, can be 
problematic and the law does not always require them to be followed.  One 
particular difficulty is that it is difficult for people to anticipate circumstances in 
enough detail that physicians have confidence that they know what the individual 
would have wanted in the situation that actually materializes.  However, where the 
patient’s previously expressed wishes are sufficiently clear and applicable to her 
present situation, the family has no right to substitute its own wishes for her 
treatment. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. §§ 154.01–.3 (2012) (granting priority to advance 
directives). 
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the state could conscript organs, it could leave the decision to 
the family, or it could, at least, presume consent so as to increase 
the supply of organs available for donation.  The law prioritizes 
individuals’ interest in posthumous bodily integrity over the 
interests of the sick and dying in receiving needed organs and, at 
least in theory, prioritizes individuals’ interest in posthumous 
bodily integrity over the interests of loved ones in deciding 
whether they want to donate the deceased’s organs.  The family 
veto suggests, however, that in practice there is some 
disagreement, at least among certain medical practitioners, with 
the way the law has prioritized the interests of individual 
potential donors over those of their loved ones. 
Consider now whose right to posthumous bodily integrity 
the UAGA seeks to protect.  Given the discussion in Part III, 
there are good reasons for respecting individuals’ express 
consent or refusal to consent to being an organ donor, regardless 
of whether an interest in posthumous bodily integrity survives 
death.  This is because respecting express wishes would protect 
the interests of the dead, if they have any, and would respect the 
critical interests of living people in their posthumous bodily 
integrity by giving them confidence that their own wishes will 
be respected in the future.  Thus, the UAGA’s requirement that 
the deceased’s express wishes be respected is consistent with 
either the dead having or not having a continued right to 
posthumous bodily integrity. 
Where an individual’s wishes regarding organ donation 
were not made explicit (legally or otherwise) but are inferable, 
the law leaves the decision to the family, subject to the caveat 
that some states preclude the family consenting if it is known 
that the individual would have objected to being an organ 
donor.  Again, the law is consistent with the relevant right to 
posthumous bodily integrity belonging either only to the living 
individual or persisting after death, but for different reasons.  If 
the deceased is thought to have an ongoing right to posthumous 
bodily integrity, Part III.B suggests that the best way to fulfill the 
deceased’s ongoing interests is for the law to mirror that of 
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substitute consent to medical treatment: a substitute decision-
maker should make the decision that best reflects what the 
deceased would have wanted for herself.  This is essentially 
what the UAGA accomplishes. 
However, if any interest in posthumous bodily integrity 
ends with death, the law might reasonably still allow for 
substitute decision-making where the deceased’s prior wishes 
are inferable.  The purpose, however, would not be to respect 
the rights of the dead, but rather to give confidence to the living 
that their own inferable wishes will be respected. 
In the situation where the deceased’s prior wishes are 
unknowable, however, it does make a difference whether the 
relevant right to posthumous bodily integrity survives death or 
not and if so, on what basis.  If the deceased has an ongoing 
right to posthumous bodily integrity generally, she will either be 
harmed by having organs removed contrary to her prior 
unexpressed wishes (on a Feinberg-style approach) or else her 
unexpressed wishes cannot form the basis of a posthumous 
interest (on a Kramer-style approach).  If the deceased can have 
no rights, then the result is the same as on a Kramer-style 
approach: an unexpressed wish cannot form the basis of a 
posthumous right. 
Anatomical gift law presumes a refusal to consent in the 
absence of known wishes.  This could reflect a view that the 
dead have a right to posthumous bodily integrity on a Feinberg 
model, in that we should err on the side of presuming non-
consent to avoid potential harm to the dead.  Alternately, it 
could reflect a view that the right of the living to decide whether 
to be organ donors justifies precluding donation without their 
express consent.  That is, even where people’s prior wishes are 
unknowable, it could give comfort to the living to know that 
they will never be made organ donors unless they, or their next 
of kin, affirmatively authorize it. 
The law is, therefore, consistent with both approaches to the 
right to posthumous bodily integrity, but the implications of one 
are much more radical than the other.  Organ donation law 
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requires balancing the interests of multiple stakeholders in the 
use of dead bodies.  As seen above, it prioritizes the interests of 
the potential organ donor over those of potential organ 
recipients, the families of both, and the interests of society 
generally.  But if any right to posthumous bodily integrity ends 
at death, the interest protected is much weaker than that if the 
right survives death.  If the right ends at death, it would mean 
that our laws protect people’s right not to have to make a 
decision about organ donation, and still not have to worry about 
being donors, over the competing rights of potential recipients, 
among others.  It is one thing to submit a rights-holder (namely 
the dead person) to unwanted bodily interference.  But if the 
dead have no rights, the only interest in posthumous bodily 
integrity at stake is that of the living in believing their wishes 
will be carried out.  They can never actually be subject to bodily 
interference contrary to their rights, because once dead they no 
longer have a right to posthumous bodily integrity.  Any 
violation that would result from allowing the removal of organs 
from those whose wishes were unknown would be a violation in 
the form of disturbing the peace of mind that comes from 
believing one’s critical interests will be fulfilled.  However, that 
violation can be avoided if the individual makes a legally 
binding decision about organ donation.  Some states also protect 
against unwanted donation where a person’s wish not to donate 
is known but wasn’t legally recorded.93
Thus, if the dead have no ongoing rights, then to preclude 
donation in the absence of any known wishes is to rate a living 
person’s critical interests in her dead body very highly.  This 
gives greater weight to people’s right not to make a decision and 
still not be an organ donor, than to the competing interests of 
potential organ recipients, for whom the matter may be one of 
life or death.  It is, therefore, harder to justify an opt-in default 
for people whose wishes are unknowable if the dead have no 
ongoing interest in posthumous bodily integrity than if they do.  
 93.  See supra text accompanying note 91.  
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This is not to say that existing anatomical gift law cannot be 
justified if the dead have no rights.  But it is easier to justify – at 
least where the deceased’s prior wishes are unknowable – if the 
dead also have a right to posthumous bodily integrity. 
The policy debate over opting in or out of organ donation 
never explicitly addresses who holds the rights.  The distinction 
between the living or dead as bearers of a right to posthumous 
bodily integrity, although somewhat philosophical, might be 
useful in policy debates.  For example, those who do not view 
the dead as rights-bearers and who support an opt-out model of 
organ donation, like Spain’s,94 could rely on arguments in the 
previous paragraphs.  That said, these arguments support an 
opt-out model most strongly in relation only to those whose 
wishes are unknowable, not to those whose wishes were 
express.  For those whose wishes can be inferred, there are good 
reasons, even if the dead have no rights, to respect them.  This 
might therefore best be reflected in a European-style policy 
where the default is consent but in practice, any family objection 
is sufficient to preclude donation.95  For those who consider the 
dead to have ongoing rights to bodily integrity, especially on a 
Feinberg model, the argument in favor of current consent 
defaults in organ donation law is easier to make. 
Given the foregoing, I suggest an intermediate proposal for 
amendments to organ donation law that should be palatable if 
the dead are thought to have no right to posthumous bodily 
integrity.  The law could allow organ donation where there is 
neither a registered refusal to consent, nor any means of 
inferring the individual’s wishes.  As a practical matter, this 
would mean where there is no accessible next of kin who objects 
to donation.  Any such amendments are only appropriate where 
the law permits the registration of a refusal, which is the case 
under the 2006 UAGA, but not in Ontario, Canada, for example, 
 94.  See generally David Rodriguez-Arias et al., Success Factors and Ethical 
Challenges of the Spanish Model of Organ Donation, 376 LANCET 1109 (2010) 
(discussing the opt-out method). 
 95.  Id. at 1110. 
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where it is only possible to register consent, not refusal.96
Without being able to register a refusal, it would be impossible 
for those without friends and family to avoid unwanted use of 
their remains. 
It could be argued that a distinction in legally permissible 
treatment based on whether wishes are inferable would make 
the law too complicated.  However, if one were of the view that 
the dead have no rights, and was convinced of the moral 
differences between those without explicit or inferable wishes 
and those who left instructions or whose wishes can be inferred 
as set out above, complexity would be a poor reason for 
maintaining the status quo.  After all, by not requiring consent 
from a subset of the population, the number of available donor 
organs would increase, thereby saving lives. 
More problematic is the fact that such a distinction would 
suggest differential, and arguably worse, treatment of the bodies 
of those who were most alone in life.  If Sara had friends and 
family to pass along her wishes, those wishes would be 
respected; but, if she didn’t, her body would be subject to 
treatment that may be contrary to the interests she held while 
alive.  Such a policy of differential treatment would be unlikely 
to be acceptable to the public, but it is not clear why.  It could be 
that the public believes the dead have rights, and so differential 
treatment of this kind would harm those dead whose wishes 
were not inferable.  Alternately, the public could view such 
differential treatment as impermissible because it would be 
unacceptable in relation to living bodies.  This begs the question 
whether the fact of death changes the moral issues at stake, but 
the point is that such policy might be a non-starter. 
Another potential objection to this proposal relates to the 
 96.  The website of the agency responsible for organ and tissue donation in 
Ontario has a “Frequently Asked Questions” section.  In response to the question: 
“Why are only ‘Yes’ responses to donation being collected?” it states: “Our goal is 
to increase organ and tissue donation in Ontario.  Our research shows jurisdictions 
that have instituted a ‘Yes’ only registry have experienced an increase in donor 
registrations.”  Frequently Asked Questions, TRILLIUM GIFT OF LIFE NETWORK,
http://www.giftoflife.on.ca/en/faq.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2013). 
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short timeframe in which organs may viably be procured for 
donation.  It may be that the next of kin cannot be contacted 
immediately but is reached after, say, 48 hours.  It is problematic 
to imagine taking organs because the next of kin cannot be 
found and there is no registered refusal, only to discover a day 
later that the deceased, while alive, made her objections to organ 
donation known.  There are two responses to this problem, both 
of which require a balancing of competing interests.  First, one 
could reject the proposed amendment altogether, so as to avoid 
that unpleasant outcome (thereby giving greater weight to the 
interests of living individuals in posthumous bodily integrity 
than to the interests of potential organ recipients).  Alternately, 
one could acknowledge and accept that risk. 
I am inclined toward the latter, although I acknowledge that 
the public may not be ready for such a change to the status quo.
That said, various state legislatures have attempted to institute 
laws that would presume consent to organ donation.97  Since this 
would have similar effects to my proposal regarding those with 
no legally expressed wishes and no next of kin (that is, their 
organs could be procured), my proposed amendment is perhaps 
not unrealistic.  In fact, my proposal has one advantage over 
presumed consent in that it is more consistent with anatomical 
gifts as an altruistic act. Rather than presuming that people want 
to make the gift, it presumes they do not and requires an 
affirmative act to change that default.  However, the proposal 
recognizes that once that person is dead, she no longer has any 
interest in what happens to her body and allows a gift to occur 
in the absence of known or inferable wishes. 
In addition, laws already exist that allow the removal of 
certain tissues from corpses without consent, so long as there is 
no known objection.  For example, some states allow removal of 
pituitary glands or corneas so long as there is no known 
 97.  Although no U.S. states have presumed consent legislation, several have 
proposed bills that would have implemented some form of presumed consent.  See, 
e.g., S. 7721, 233rd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2010); S. 3613, 96th Gen. Assemb., 
Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2010); S. 11-042, 68th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2011). 
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opposition to removal.98  In other words, there is an opt-out 
rather than an opt-in approach to removing pituitary glands and 
corneas in some states.  Although pituitary glands and corneas 
are different than hearts or kidneys, I see no reason why the 
nature of the consent requirement should depend on the nature 
of the organ.  Or if it does, the consent requirement should 
arguably be less strict regarding life-saving organs than 
regarding the organs that improve but do not (directly) save 
lives.  Note, however, that although such laws exist, it is far from 
clear that the public accepts removal of even pituitary glands 
and corneas without consent.99
To summarize, U.S. anatomical gift law requires consent for 
organ donation, and preferably the prior consent of the 
deceased.  This is true regardless of whether the deceased’s 
wishes are known or knowable.  This is consistent with either 
the dead or only the living having an interest in posthumous 
bodily integrity; but, it is easier to reconcile, where the 
deceased’s wishes are unknowable, with the former.  If the 
public and legislators are of the view that interests protected by 
law can belong only to the living, they should consider 
amending anatomical gift legislation so as to permit the use of 
organs in the absence of the individual’s prior consent if that 
individual’s wishes were not expressed and cannot now be 
known. 
B. MEDICAL RESEARCH AND EDUCATION
Another way in which the law protects an interest in 
posthumous bodily integrity is through limitations on when and 
how a corpse may be used for medical research or education.  
Like organ donation, the issue of medical research and 
 98.  See ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-320 (2009).  See also COLO. REV. STAT. § 30-10-
621 (2012). 
 99.  See Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d 786 (9th Cir. 2002).  
Sathyavaglswaran involved a lawsuit brought by parents who objected to the non-
consensual removal of their deceased child’s corneas.  In addition, the trend seems 
to lean toward states requiring consent for the removal of all tissue. 
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education is governed by state legislation that, for the most part, 
has adopted the UAGA.100  Such statutes set out purposes for 
which anatomical gifts may be made; and, in addition to organ 
transplantation these include medical and dental research, and 
medical or dental education.101  The same consent requirements 
apply as regarding cadaveric organ donation: the default is that 
no research or educational use is permitted, consent is required 
to displace this default, and the family’s wishes are only legally 
relevant if the deceased did not express her consent or refusal in 
a legally valid manner.102  It is likely that, by analogy to the 
family veto in the organ donation context, research and 
educational facilities would be reluctant to take possession of a 
corpse to which they were legally entitled in the face of 
opposition by the surviving family.  However, to the extent that 
a right to posthumous bodily integrity is a negative right rather 
than a positive right, this poses few problems.  Certainly 
hospitals and universities are not legally required to carry out 
research on a corpse simply because the deceased’s prior consent 
was obtained.103
As with organ donation, there are societal benefits that flow 
from medical education and research.  One could therefore 
imagine a legal regime in which bodies were made available for 
such use without the deceased’s prior consent or without the 
next of kin’s consent.  However, as with organ donation, the law 
gives greater weight to the interest in posthumous bodily 
integrity than to the competing interests of families and society. 
By analogy with the discussion of organ donation above, 
laws governing medical research and educational uses of 
corpses can be reconciled either with a view that the dead have 
 100.  Acts: Anatomical Gift Act (2006), UNIF. L. COMM’N,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Anatomical%20Gift%20Act%20(2006) 
(last visited May 17, 2013). 
 101.  See, e.g., Illinois Anatomical Gift Act, 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/5-10 (2007). 
 102.  U.A.G.A. §§ 8–9 (2008).   
 103.  Some states’ legislation explicitly provide that the donee may accept or 
reject the gift.  See, e.g., Illinois Anatomical Gift Act, 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/5-45(a) 
(2007). 
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an ongoing interest in posthumous bodily integrity or that they 
do not.  This is especially true where the individual’s prior 
wishes are known.  But even if they are not known, the law still 
favors individuals’ interest in posthumous bodily integrity over 
the interests of those who benefit from medical education and 
research.  If only the living have a right to posthumous bodily 
integrity, it would mean that people not only have the right to 
refuse to have their corpse used for medical research, but also 
they have a right to refuse to make a decision and still not have 
their body studied.  Given the benefit to the sick, medical 
students, and society in general, it is less easy to justify this 
outcome than if the dead themselves are construed as having a 
right to their posthumous bodily integrity.  If that were the case 
it makes more sense to weigh the interest in posthumous bodily 
integrity more heavily, since the potential harm is an unwilling 
interference with the rights-holder’s body rather than the 
knowledge that one’s critical interests may not be fulfilled if one 
does not take affirmative steps to ensure they are protected. 
This argument is, therefore, similar to one made above in 
the organ donation context.  However, in the medical education 
and research context it is easier to justify giving priority to the 
interests of the living in their posthumous bodily integrity over 
those with competing interests than in the organ donation 
context.  This is because the competing interests in the medical 
education and research contexts are less compelling than in the 
organ donation context.  In the former, there are important 
benefits of medical education and research, but they do not 
immediately save lives.  A single cadaveric organ donor, 
however, can save multiple lives.  Thus, the law’s refusal to 
allow the use of a person’s body for medical education and 
research when that person’s wishes about such use are 
unknowable is more justifiable, if the living have an interest in 
posthumous bodily integrity, than the law’s refusal to allow 
organ donation where the person’s wishes are unknowable.  The 
stakes are not as high. 
Now consider my legislative proposal, above, that organ 
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donation law allow organ procurement from cadavers where the 
person’s prior wishes are unknowable.  I argued that this was a 
reasonable proposal if legislators (and the public generally) were 
of the opinion that an interest in posthumous bodily integrity 
does not survive death.  In the context of medical research and 
education such a proposal should be less objectionable than in 
the organ donation context since there is less urgency regarding 
the former than the latter.  A greater window of time could be 
allowed for finding next of kin so as to avoid the problem of 
being unsure whether the deceased made her prior wishes 
known.  An amendment to anatomical gift laws could mirror 
laws in some states that allow autopsy without the consent of 
the next of kin only if the next of kin cannot be contacted within 
a certain period of time.  For example, Connecticut allows 
autopsy without consent if a reasonable amount of time has 
elapsed, during which the next of kin cannot be reached.104  A 
reasonable amount of time is defined as between 12 and 48 
hours.105
C. CHOOSING THE MEANS OF DISPOSAL
Laws in many states allow individuals to decide whether 
they will be buried or cremated.106  These laws also protect an 
interest in posthumous bodily integrity.  At common law, 
individuals cannot make legally binding decisions about the 
means of disposal of their bodies.  This is because the law of 
succession is said only to contemplate transfers of property and 
one’s body is not property at common law.107  Despite academic 
challenges to both premises,108 courts applying the common law 
have consistently held that testamentary or other expressed 
 104.  CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-286 (2009). 
 105. Id.
 106.  See discussion infra Part IV.C. 
 107. SPERLING, supra note 18, at 150 (citing O’Donnell v. Slack, 55 P. 906 (Cal. 
1899); In re Estate of Moyer, 577 P.2d 108, 110 (Utah 1978); Fischer’s Estate v. 
Fischer, 117 N.E.2d 855, 859 (Ill. App. Ct. 1954)).
108.  Id. at 150–53. 
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wishes about the disposal of one’s corpse are not binding.109
That said, most U.S. states have overridden the common 
law on this matter through legislation.  In many states, the law 
grants individuals the right to decide for themselves how their 
corpses will be disposed.  For example, Arizona law provides 
that: “[a] legally competent adult may prepare a written 
statement directing the cremation or other lawful disposition of 
the legally competent adult’s own remains . . . .”110  Section C of 
the same provision clarifies that if such a statement is made, 
cemeteries and crematories do not need to obtain anyone else’s 
consent to carry out the selected disposition.111  Further, the 
person who has the legal duty to dispose of the body must 
follow the deceased’s wishes regarding disposal, subject to 
exceptions relating to reasonableness and financial burden.112
Many states have statutes similar to Arizona’s,113 but some 
grant to next of kin the right to decide the means of disposal,114
while others allow individuals to designate whomever they wish 
to make the decision.115  Depending on the state, that designated 
person may or may not be bound to follow any validly 
expressed instructions left by the deceased.116
In states where one may decide how one’s body will be 
disposed, the decision is not unconstrained: in addition to 
limitations of reasonableness and cost (mentioned above) there 
 109.  See, e.g., Saleh v. Reichert (1993), 104 D.LR. 4th 384, 391 (Can. Ont. (Gen. 
Div.)) (stating that in Canada “the expressed wishes of a person as to the 
disposition of his or her body cannot be enforced in law.”). 
 110. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-1365.01(A) (2012). 
 111.  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-1365.01(C) (2012). 
 112. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-831.01(A) (2012). 
 113.  See, e.g., 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 65/5 (2012). 
 114.  See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 34-13-11 (2013).  In addition, all Canadian provinces 
except Quebec and British Columbia leave that decision to the next of kin as a 
matter of common law.  See J. Downie et al., Family Override of Valid Donor Consent to 
Postmortem Donation: Issues in Law and Practice, 40 TRANSPLANTATION PROCEEDINGS
1255, 1257 (2008). 
 115.  See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4201(2)(a)(i) (McKinney 2012). 
 116.  See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH Law § 4201(2)(c) (McKinney 2012) (stating that 
a decedent’s wishes are constrained by what the agent believes is “lawful and 
practicable”). 
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are restrictions relating to public safety and dignity.117  Safety 
concerns are reflected in laws that limit the locations in which 
human remains (whether cremated or not) may be disposed – 
for example not near a water supply.118
Usually the choice is between burial and cremation,119 but 
other means of disposal may be legally available.  For example, 
in California having your body cryonically preserved – that is, 
frozen and stored with the intent of being revived when 
technology permits – is a legally valid means of disposal if a 
cryonics company is selected as the donee of the body pursuant 
to anatomical gift legislation.120
One can also designate an organization like Body Worlds to 
be the donee of one’s corpse through anatomical gift legislation.  
Recall that Body Worlds exhibits preserved corpses for 
educational and artistic purposes.121  According to Body Worlds,
anatomical gift legislation is the legal mechanism by which it 
receives corpses.122  As a result, consent is required.  (As 
discussed in Part I.A, competitor Bodies: The Exhibition uses 
Chinese bodies whose consent would not have been obtained in 
accordance with anatomical gift law.)  However, most states 
have not legislated specifically in relation to preserved cadaver 
exhibits, and so it is not clear that those states would apply their 
anatomical gift law to this context in the same way as to organ 
donation or medical research.  Further, I am aware of no 
litigation regarding whether an individual’s consent to donate 
her body to Body Worlds is legally binding.  Presumably Body 
Worlds would prefer to relinquish any legal claim to a cadaver 
 117.  See SPERLING, supra note 18, at 171–85 (outlining limitations on the ability to 
determine the manner of disposal of one’s corpse). 
 118.  See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 114, § 35 (2012). 
 119. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7102 (West 2012) (listing burial, 
cremation, and burial at sea as legally valid means of disposing of a corpse). 
120. Alcor Life Extension Found., Inc. v. Mitchell, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 572, 575 (1992). 
 121.  Mission of the Exhibitions, BODY WORLDS,
http://www.bodyworlds.com/en/exhibitions/mission_exhibitions.html (last visited 
May 24, 2013). 
 122.  Body Donation for Plastination, BODY WORLDS,
http://www.bodyworlds.com/en/body_donation.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2013). 
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rather than risk the public relations nightmare of fighting with 
grieving survivors over the right to inject the deceased with 
polymers and put her on public display. 
Some states have proposed legislation that would prohibit 
such exhibitions for profit without the deceased’s prior 
consent,123 but in most cases, these laws have not (yet) been 
enacted.  One exception is Florida where legislation prohibiting 
certain displays of preserved cadavers without consent was 
enacted in 2009.124  State legislative proposals have tended to 
emphasize the need for consent rather than proscribing such 
displays entirely.125
Contrary to this trend, Hawaii has banned Body Worlds-type 
cadaver displays altogether, regardless of consent.126  Hawaii’s 
law followed, and presumably was triggered by, the Bodies: The 
Exhibition scandal over the non-consensual use of Chinese 
prisoners’ bodies. 
Both cryonic preservation and preserved cadaver exhibits 
have been controversial, worldwide, in that some do not 
consider them appropriate and respectful ways of treating 
human remains.127  However, notwithstanding the controversy 
surrounding the potential indignity, Americans can choose to 
have their corpses cryonically preserved or put on public 
display and the law may well protect this choice.128  Although 
neither the common law nor legislation grant a positive right to 
be cryonically preserved or put on display, laws such as state 
anatomical gift legislation and specific statutes regarding 
 123.  See, e.g., H.R. 2299, 2008 Leg., Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2008) (requiring 
evidence of informed consent for public display of human remains); Assemb. 1519, 
2008 Leg., 2007-2008 Sess. (Cal. 2008) (legislation was enacted in California but was 
returned without Governor Schwarzenegger’s signature, and so did not become 
law); S.B. 1130, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2011). 
 124. FLA. STAT. § 406.61 (2009). 
125. Giunta, supra note 1, at 183–84. 
 126. HAW. REV. STAT. § 327-38 (2013). 
 127.  See Giunta, supra note 1, at 185–89 (discussing that the French litigation 
against Bodies: The Exhibition relied on arguments based on the dignity of human 
remains). 
 128.  See, e.g., Alcor Life Extension Found., Inc. v. Mitchell, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 572, 
575 (1992); FLA. STAT. § 406.61 (2009). 
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choosing the means of disposal of one’s corpse reflect a policy 
decision that people should be allowed to choose what becomes 
of their human remains.  Legislation like Florida’s Public Health 
law reflects a view that such exhibits should generally be 
permitted unless there was no consent for that use of cadavers.129
Further, laws granting individuals the right to decide how their 
corpses will be disposed of exemplify a legal right to 
posthumous bodily integrity that takes precedence over the 
wishes of the family and over some people’s sense of what 
amounts to dignified treatment – at least in some states.  That 
interest, however, must give way to competing interests in other 
contexts, such as where public health is at stake. 
Having established that many states’ laws regarding 
disposal of corpses grant a right to posthumous bodily integrity, 
the question becomes whose posthumous bodily integrity?  In 
states that allow individuals to make the decision for 
themselves, the law appears equally consistent with a view that 
the interest ends at death or that it survives death.  Allowing 
individuals to decide for themselves could suggest that the dead 
have an ongoing interest in how their bodies are treated, or that 
only living individuals have an interest in how their future 
corpses will be treated, but that allowing them to decide and 
respecting that decision gives confidence to others that their 
own critical interests will be protected. 
However, the fact that some states maintain the common 
law approach of not letting individuals decide for themselves 
how their bodies will be disposed may suggest a view that the 
interest in posthumous bodily integrity belongs only to the 
living.  It would arguably be a worse violation of a decedent’s 
interests to make her final resting place one she would have 
rejected than it would be a violation of a living person’s interest 
in posthumous bodily integrity to simply deny him a say in 
what his final resting place will be.  This argument mirrors those 
above in the organ donation and medical education contexts, in 
 129.  FLA. STAT. § 406.61 (2009). 
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that it assumes a bodily interference contrary to the rights-
holder’s interests is worse than uncertainty in relation to 
whether one’s interests will be fulfilled.  In any event, it seems 
inconsistent to respect posthumous bodily integrity regarding 
organ donation, medical research and education, but not 
regarding the means of disposal.  The traditional response to the 
uniqueness of anatomical gifts is that they involve an altruistic 
act, but this does not obviously address why the interest in 
posthumous bodily integrity should be diminished in the 
context of choosing the means of disposal. 
Another possible explanation is that one’s body must be 
disposed in some way and the decision about means is about 
alternatives, not about whether one’s body will be interfered 
with at all.  Organ donation and educational and research uses, 
on the other hand, are by no means inevitable.  Finally, part of 
the answer seems to lie in what treatment of corpses is most 
common.  Almost everyone is either buried or cremated after 
death, and both are common, whereas very few of us will ever 
be organ donors and even fewer still will be cryonically frozen 
or put on display in a museum.  It may be that the more 
unexpected the use of one’s cadaver, the greater the interest 
individuals have in making a binding decision about that use, 
since it is less likely to be acceptable to them. 
D. POSTHUMOUS REPRODUCTION
Posthumous reproduction refers to conception or birth after 
the death of one or both biological parents.130  It need not involve 
interference with a corpse: for example, sperm or eggs can be 
removed from the living and used to create an embryo after the 
death of the genetic parent.  This raises issues of reproductive 
autonomy but need not implicate posthumous bodily integrity.  
However, there are two types of reproduction in which 
posthumous bodily integrity is necessarily implicated: post-
mortem sperm removal and the maintenance of a legally dead 
 130.  John A. Robertson, Posthumous Reproduction, 69 IND. L.J. 1027, 1027 (1994). 
33718-m
qe_14-2 Sheet No. 59 Side A      07/02/2013   13:56:24
33718-mqe_14-2 Sheet No. 59 Side A      07/02/2013   13:56:24
C M
Y K
PUBLISHED.YOUNG.MACROS (DO NOT DELETE) 6/17/2013 1:02 PM 
2013] POSTHUMOUS BODILY INTEGRITY 253 
woman’s body on life support to continue gestating a fetus. 
Posthumous reproduction is largely unregulated in the 
United States.131  (A bill that would have required consent for 
posthumous sperm retrieval was proposed in New York but was 
never enacted.)132  As a result, its permissibility, essentially, 
depends on the protocols of clinics and hospitals. 
Although there is no general legal right in the U.S. to 
posthumous bodily integrity in relation to posthumous sperm 
removal, the laws of certain other countries grant such a right133
and the ethics literature in the United States suggests that 
reproduction-related interferences with a corpse should not be 
permitted without the deceased’s prior consent.134
The situation is less clear regarding maintaining a pregnant 
woman’s dead body on life support to enable a fetus to come to 
term.  On the one hand, in such situations, the woman’s prior 
wishes appear to be legally determinative.  Minnesota, for 
example, which is among the states to have adopted the 
Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act or the Uniform Health-
Care Decisions Act, makes a woman’s wishes determinative.  
Minnesota law provides that a pregnant woman is presumed to 
have wanted to be maintained on life support for the purpose of 
gestating her fetus to the point of viability.135  However, this is 
only a presumption.  Clear and convincing evidence that the 
woman’s wishes were to the contrary would preclude 
maintaining her on life support.136  (The requirement of “clear 
 131.  See JESSICA ARONS, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, FUTURE CHOICES: ASSISTED 
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND THE LAW 1 (2007). 
 132.  Assemb. 8043, 1999–2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1999). 
 133.  See e.g., Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 1990, c. 37, § 12, sch. 3 
(Eng.); Assisted Human Reproduction Act, R.S.C. 2004, c. L-2 (Can.) (both 
proscribing removing sperm for reproductive purposes without consent).  
 134.  See, e.g., The Ethics Committee of the American Society for Reproductive 
Medicine, Posthumous Reproduction, 82 FERTIL. & STERIL. S260, S261 (Supp. 2004) 
(stating that a request by a surviving spouse for posthumous sperm removal need 
not be honored).  See also Frances Batzer et al., Postmortem Parenthood and the Need for 
a Protocol with Posthumous Sperm Procurement, 79 FERTIL. & STERIL. 1263, 1263, 1265, 
1268 (2003) (acknowledging the lack of regulation and recommending protocols 
that would require actual or inferred consent to posthumous sperm removal). 
 135.  MINN. STAT. § 145C.10(g) (2012). 
 136.  Id.
33718-m
qe_14-2 Sheet No. 59 Side B      07/02/2013   13:56:24
33718-mqe_14-2 Sheet No. 59 Side B      07/02/2013   13:56:24
C M
Y K
PUBLISHED.YOUNG.MACROS (DO NOT DELETE) 6/17/2013 1:02 PM 
254 MARQUETTE ELDER’S ADVISOR [Vol. 14 
and convincing evidence” distinguishes posthumous sperm 
removal, where the presumption is generally that the deceased 
did not want to reproduce posthumously, from the situation of a 
pregnant woman on life support.) 
The University Health Services, Inc. v. Piazzi case,137 however, 
suggests a different approach than Minnesota’s.  It involved a 
legal battle in Georgia over whether to maintain Donna Piazzi’s 
legally dead body on life support in order to allow her fetus to 
develop.  She had left no instructions regarding this situation 
and her husband and family opposed continued life support.  
The biological father of the child, however, who was not Piazzi’s 
husband, petitioned for the body to be maintained on life 
support.  The court held that since Donna Piazzi was dead she 
had no constitutional right to privacy and relying in part on a 
pregnancy clause in Georgia’s Natural Death Act, it granted the 
biological father’s petition.138  Thus, despite no prior (explicit or 
inferred) consent to having her body maintained on life support, 
the court allowed such treatment of her body.139  The 
inconsistency with Minnesota law lies not in the outcome but in 
the fact that the court treated Donna Piazzi’s wishes as 
irrelevant.  That said, the case has been criticized as both poorly 
reasoned and as having little precedential value, given its 
reliance on the specific pregnancy clause of the Natural Death 
Act.140
Even when consent is required, it is not clear to what extent 
the law aims to protect posthumous bodily integrity per se, as 
opposed to reproductive autonomy.  Carson Strong notes that 
the requirement for consent to posthumous sperm retrieval can 
relate to two different issues: the physical interference with the 
bodies of the dead and the reproductive issue.141  (And the same 
 137.  Univ. Health Serv., Inc. v. Piazzi reprinted in 2 Issues L. & Med. 415 (1987). 
 138.  Id. at 416–18. 
139.  Id. at 418. 
 140.  See, e.g., DANIEL SPERLING, MANAGEMENT OF POST-MORTEM PREGNANCY:
LEGAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECTS 133 (2006). 
 141.  Carson Strong, Ethical and Legal Aspects of Sperm Retrieval After Death or 
Persistent Vegetative State, 27 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 347, 347–48 (1999). 
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is true regarding interferences with a dead pregnant woman’s 
body.)  He suggests that the former is only problematic in the 
absence of consent.142  It may, therefore, be that guidelines in 
relation to posthumous reproduction are largely consistent with 
other laws granting a right to posthumous bodily integrity.  
However, given the lack of legislation and case law in this 
emerging area of the law, it is too soon to say what rights people 
have in relation to reproduction-related interferences with their 
corpses. 
What is clear is that requiring prior consent for posthumous 
reproduction would protect a right to posthumous bodily 
integrity in a manner consistent either with the dead or only the 
living being the rights-bearer.  On Feinberg’s model the dead 
rights-bearer would have an ongoing interest in the treatment of 
her body and perhaps also in making reproductive decisions.  
Prior consent should, therefore, be required, especially since 
competing interests are weaker than in the organ donation 
context, for example.  The competing interest primarily involves 
the deceased’s partner’s interest in having a child with the 
deceased. 
On Kramer’s model, the existence of ongoing interests that 
could ground rights would depend on whether the deceased’s 
prior wishes regarding posthumous reproduction were known 
to living people.  If they are not known, posthumous 
reproduction without consent cannot harm the deceased’s 
interests in posthumous bodily integrity because she would 
have none.  Any harm to an interest in posthumous bodily 
integrity would be in relation to the interests of the living, who 
do not want to be posthumous parents without their explicit 
consent.  In that case, the law would likely still require prior 
consent for posthumous reproduction so as to reassure the living 
that they will not be posthumous parents without consent. 
As with other laws that grant a right to posthumous bodily 
integrity, requiring prior consent, although consistent with the 
142.  Id. at 348. 
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dead having or not having an interest in posthumous bodily 
integrity, is easier to justify on the former view.  The interests of 
the living in posthumous bodily integrity are implicated either 
way, but if the dead also have such an interest, posthumous 
reproduction against the deceased’s prior wishes amounts to an 
additional, and not insignificant, interference with posthumous 
bodily integrity. 
E. RIGHT TO REFUSE AN AUTOPSY
Autopsy is generally unlawful without consent, subject to 
certain exceptions related to law enforcement and public 
health.143  Some states provide for the deceased individual’s 
prior consent or refusal.  In New York, for example, if the 
deceased is carrying a notarized card indicating a refusal to be 
dissected or autopsied, that must be respected, subject to the 
exceptions noted above.144  As in the anatomical gift context, in 
the absence of consent or refusal by the deceased, the next of 
kin’s consent to autopsy must be obtained.145  In many states, 
however, there is no provision for the individual herself to 
consent.146  This may reflect a view that the next of kin has a 
better moral claim to consenting to autopsy than the individual 
herself or, more likely in my opinion, it may reflect the common 
law, by virtue of which the next of kin had rights and duties 
associated with the right of possession of a corpse.  Not 
providing for individuals to legally refuse autopsies on their 
own body may also simply reflect the fact that it is rare for 
someone to indicate a refusal to be autopsied before her own 
death. 
 143.  See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 4209-a, 4210, 4210-c (McKinney 2012); 
MO. REV. STAT. § 194.115(1) (2012). 
 144.  N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 4209-a, 4210, 4210-c (McKinney 2012).  Other 
states have similar provisions in regards to providing prior consent or refusal to 
autopsy.  See 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/2 (2012), and N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-12-4(A)(1) 
(2012). 
 145.  See, e.g., 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/2(b) (2012); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-12-4(A) 
(2012). 
 146.  See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-286 (2012). 
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In states like New York, laws requiring consent for autopsy, 
like the other laws examined in this section, exemplify a legal 
right to posthumous bodily integrity.  Laws requiring consent 
for autopsy are equally consistent with only the living or also the 
dead having an interest in posthumous bodily integrity.  The 
living have critical interests in the treatment of their corpse, 
including its dissection for autopsy, and if those interests 
survive death, dead individuals would have a similar interest in 
how their cadaver is treated.  As always, however, the argument 
for requiring consent is somewhat stronger if the dead and the 
living both have an interest in posthumous bodily integrity. 
F. THE LONG DEAD
I conclude with one context in which posthumous bodily 
integrity receives very little legal protection: that is, in relation to 
the long dead.  Museums frequently contain displays of ancient 
human remains, and these are generally much less controversial 
than Body Worlds-type exhibits.  Most people have no objection 
to the display of the bodies of the long dead.  In a survey 
conducted in the United Kingdom by English Heritage, 
approximately 90% of respondents claimed to be comfortable 
with displaying prehistoric human bodies in museums.147
Evidence of this acceptance also comes from the fact that 
exhibits of human remains are among the most popular.148
Further evidence is that the new Hawaii law banning the display 
of corpses for commercial purposes excludes the bodies of those 
who have been dead for more than 80 years.149
Part of the reason why Body Worlds is more controversial 
than a museum mummy exhibit may relate to the way in which 
bodies are displayed.  In the former, bodies are artistically 
posed, being made to appear to be exploding or performing a 
 147.  BDRC, RESEARCH INTO ISSUES SURROUNDING HUMAN BONES IN MUSEUMS
(2009). 
 148. TIFFANY JENKINS, CONTESTING HUMAN REMAINS IN MUSEUM COLLECTIONS
127 (2011). 
 149. HAW. REV. STAT. § 327-38(c)(1) (2012). 
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trapeze routine.  One recent controversy even involved corpses 
posed in sexual positions.150  The bodies are highly manipulated, 
both in terms of the polymers that are introduced into the body 
and the manner of display. 
However, much of the difference in the degree of 
controversy surely relates to the timeline involved.  The 
deceased on display in Body Worlds have all died within the past 
few decades, and many have living relatives.  Ancient mummies 
and other prehistoric human remains are long dead.  Not only is 
no one alive who knew them in life, but in many cases their 
culture and way of life no longer exists.  They are truly foreign 
to us.  It is surely no coincidence that the Hawaii legislation 
exempts bodies of those dead 80 years or more, 80 years being a 
person’s approximate life span.  We can infer that the reason for 
choosing 80 years was to ensure the impossibility of viewing, on 
display in a museum, the body of someone one knew in life.  
Simply put, the law allows the display of ancient corpses in 
museums without the individuals’ prior consent but, assuming 
anatomical gift legislation governs the procurement of corpses 
for these exhibits, does not allow the display of the recently dead 
without consent.151  This can perhaps be explained in part by the 
fact that there are property rights in long dead corpses but not in 
recently dead ones.152
U.S. federal laws governing the treatment of ancient human 
remains focus on two issues: what to do if ancient remains are 
discovered, and the repatriation of remains – especially Native 
American remains – in the possession of others.  The federal 
 150.  Jason Rhodes, Body Worlds Plans Cadaver Show Dedicated to Sex, REUTERS,
Sept. 11, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE58A4Z220090911. 
 151.  Strictly speaking it is not display that would be prohibited under 
anatomical gift legislation.  Rather, Body Worlds has no right to the body in the first 
place in the absence of consent.  Given that Body Worlds preserves bodies for the 
purpose of putting them on public display, it is arguable that consent would be 
insufficient unless it contemplated display.  However, many current donors do not 
leave instructions as to how to display their bodies, “dismissing this as vanity.”  See 
Jason Rhodes, Body Worlds Plans Cadaver Show Dedicated to Sex, REUTERS, Sept. 11, 
2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE58A4Z220090911. 
 152.  See SPERLING, supra note 18, at 108–110, for an examination of the long 
dead exception to the no property rule regarding human remains. 
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Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act 
(hereinafter NAGPRA)153 provides that Native Americans have 
the best claim to the remains of Native Americans newly 
discovered on federal or tribal land.154  It also provides that 
federal institutions in possession of the remains of Native 
Americans must inventory them, notify the Native American 
group to which the deceased belonged, if possible, and return 
the remains to the Native American group if requested to do 
so.155  Note that the Act does not require the repatriation of the 
remains of non-Native Americans – of ancient mummies for 
example.156  (Although the reality is that any ancient remains 
newly discovered in the United States will be those of Native 
Americans, U.S. federal institutions may well be in possession of 
ancient remains of non-Native Americans). 
A thorough discussion of the law governing the treatment 
of ancient remains is beyond the scope of this article, but what is 
important to note about NAGPRA is that it does not require the 
prior consent of the individuals whose remains are at issue for 
any of the permitted actions.  Of course, obtaining such prior 
consent is impossible in the case of ancient remains, and so it 
makes a certain amount of sense to focus on the wishes of 
descendants.  However, NAGPRA differs from laws such as the 
UAGA in that it contains no default rule that no interferences 
are permitted without the consent of the deceased or of a 
surviving family member.  Under the UAGA, a failure to find a 
relative who can give consent means that organ donation or 
medical research cannot legally occur.157  The same is true in 
many states regarding autopsy (subject to certain exceptions).158
Certainly cryonic preservation or display in a Body Worlds
exhibit are impermissible without consent.159  Under the 
 153.  25 U.S.C. § 3001–13 (1991). 
 154.  25 U.S.C. § 3002(a) (1991). 
 155.  25 U.S.C. §§ 3003, 3005(a) (1991). 
 156.  See 25 U.S.C. § 3005(a)(4) (1991). 
 157.  See discussion supra Parts IV.A–B. 
 158.  See discussion supra Part IV.E. 
 159.  See discussion supra Part IV.C. 
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NAGPRA, however, an inability to find a “culturally affiliated” 
group160 triggers obligations but does not necessarily preclude 
display or research on the remains.161
Another difference is that cultural affiliation need not be 
based on genetic or other family ties.  Although the reliance on a 
broader concept of cultural affiliation may simply reflect 
evidentiary difficulties in proving a genetic relationship, it 
appears also to reflect a desire to respect cultural traditions, 
values and beliefs regarding the dead.  In repatriating bodies to 
Native American groups culturally affiliated with those former 
people, the law is not only saying that it is for those people’s 
direct descendants to decide what happens to the body, but that 
the bodies should be treated in a culturally appropriate way.  
The law does not appear to protect an individual’s interest in 
bodily integrity – it protects the cultural descendants’ interests 
in disposing of their dead according to their own custom.  As 
discussed above, there are laws that protect the interests of 
society in the dignified treatment of human remains (the 
requirement to dispose of corpses in a dignified manner, for 
example).  NAGPRA appears to reflect a desire to protect this 
kind of interest rather than an interest in posthumous bodily 
integrity. 
Thus, laws in relation to the bodies of the long dead do not 
appear to protect an interest in posthumous bodily integrity.  
The theories of interests of the living and the dead in the 
treatment of their own corpses may help to explain why the law 
treats the long dead differently than the recently dead regarding 
posthumous bodily integrity.  If an interest in posthumous 
bodily integrity belongs only to the living, those interests expire 
when the individual does.  We have seen that in that case, 
respecting people’s wishes is important not because we owe any 
duties to the dead, but because we wish to give confidence to the 
living that their own wishes will be respected.  In addition, it is 
wrong to break promises even if it is not a wrong to the 
160. 25 U.S.C. § 3001(2) (1991). 
 161.  See 25 U.S.C. § 3005 (1991). 
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deceased. 
Non-consensual interferences with the bodies of the long 
dead may pose less of a threat to the living than interferences 
with the recently dead and do not implicate broken promises.  
Those who exhibit ancient Egyptian mummies, of course, did 
not promise those ancient Egyptian people that their wishes not 
to be disturbed would be respected, and so no promises have 
been broken.  In terms of giving confidence to the living that 
their wishes will be respected, it is easier for us to identify with 
the recently dead, and especially those whom we knew 
personally, than with ancient corpses.  We may not personally 
want our future corpses put on display, but the display of an 
Egyptian mummy does not make us fear that our own wishes 
regarding our corpses will be ignored.  This is not only because 
we are less able to relate to the ancient dead, but also because 
the law protects us differently than it protects the ancient dead.  
We can, therefore, fulfill the critical interests of the currently 
living in not having their future cadavers put on display while 
still placing ancient corpses on display. 
However, putting ancient corpses on display may be more 
problematic if the dead have an ongoing interest in bodily 
integrity, depending on the approach taken to the interests of the 
dead.  According to Smolensky, the interests of the dead can 
only stay the same over time or diminish.162  This view derives 
from Kramer’s theory of interests in which the dead have 
interests only because, and to the extent that, the living have 
knowledge of specific deceased people.163  For example, dead 
people such as one’s grandmother or Shakespeare continue to 
have interests because they live on in the minds of the living, 
whereas those who are dead and forgotten have none.  
According to this approach, it makes sense to view the interests 
of the dead as diminishing – or at least disappearing – over time, 
although it is not clear how this actually works.  Do a dead 
person’s interests remain so long as one person remembers her?  
 162.  Smolensky, supra note 14, at 789–91. 
 163.  See discussion supra Part II.D. 
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Do they diminish in degree or do they exist fully until the 
deceased is no longer remembered by anyone?  Regardless, it is 
clear that according to Kramer’s theory, the dead will have no 
interests once they are completely forgotten. 
Since no one now exists who knew the ancient dead 
personally, and most ancient dead are anonymous, a Smolensky-
Kramer approach would suggest that those decedents lost their 
interest in posthumous bodily integrity centuries ago.  As former 
human beings, we should treat their bodies with respect (which 
may or may not argue against their public display), but they, 
themselves, no longer have any moral claim to bodily integrity. 
An interesting issue arises, however, in relation to the 
ancient dead who were not anonymous.  Much is known about 
certain ancient Egyptian Pharaohs: Ramses II and Tutankhamen 
continue to exist in the minds of at least some.  Have they then 
retained their interest in posthumous bodily integrity?  If so, this 
raises a number of questions, not pursued further here, about 
why the famous dead should have different moral claims to 
bodily integrity than the anonymous dead.  It also raises the 
question whether interests can be lost with anonymity, but then 
regained if new information comes to light.  Suffice it to say that 
even the theory of interests of the dead proposed by Smolensky 
and Kramer cannot fully account for our treatment of the ancient 
dead because we do not apply different consent requirements to 
the ancient dead depending on whether they are anonymous or 
known. 
Feinberg and Pitcher’s ante-mortem person theory of the 
rights of the dead fit even less well with our law and practices in 
relation to the long dead.  Recall that according to these 
approaches it is not clear that the interests of the dead in their 
bodily integrity would ever diminish or disappear.164  If their 
interests are independent of people’s knowledge and memory of 
the dead, they could presumably persist indefinitely. 
If the dead have interests that do not diminish over time, 
 164.  See discussion supra Part II.D. 
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then there is no reason to treat the ancient dead differently from 
the recently dead in relation to their interest in bodily integrity 
(unless the competing interests of the living take on greater 
weight over time, but it is not clear why this would be so).  
Extrapolating from Feinberg and Pitcher, we should seek to 
determine what the ancient dead person would have wanted 
and respect those wishes absent a compelling reason to do 
otherwise.  If we are unable to determine what the person would 
have wanted, we should err on the side of caution and limit any 
interferences with the corpse – especially ones that most people 
would not agree to, such as public display.  This would lead to 
the conclusion that unless other benefits of exhibits, for example 
educational value, are such as to outweigh the deceased’s 
interest in posthumous bodily integrity, we should not exhibit 
an Egyptian mummy’s corpse in a museum.  This is especially so 
given that it is inferable based on ancient Egyptian culture and 
the efforts that were made to protect the tombs of mummies that 
the ancient Egyptians did not want their corpses put on public 
display. 
To summarize, the law treats ancient corpses differently 
than those of the recently dead.  The former may be the subject 
of research or educational display without the consent of the 
deceased or her relatives.  No such conduct is legally permissible 
in relation to the recently dead without the prior consent of the 
deceased or the substitute consent of the next of kin.  The 
theories underlying an interest in posthumous bodily integrity 
provide different explanations for why this may be the case.  If 
only the living have an interest in posthumous bodily integrity, 
then non-consensual actions in relation to an ancient corpse do 
not violate that interest any more than non-consensual actions in 
relation to the recently dead violate the interest.  The difference 
lies in the need to give the living confidence that their wishes 
will be respected after death.  Since the ancient dead were not, 
while alive, subject to modern legal regimes, and because we do 
not as readily identify with the ancient dead than with the 
recently dead, treating the ancient dead differently does not 
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threaten people’s confidence that their own wishes will be 
respected after their deaths. 
If the dead themselves have an ongoing interest in 
posthumous bodily integrity, it may still make sense to treat the 
ancient dead differently if posthumous interests are tied to the 
deceased living on in the knowledge and memory of the living.  
Assuming that the ancient dead are anonymous, their 
posthumous interests have expired.  However, if the ancient 
dead are not anonymous, or if we take a view of posthumous 
interests that does not require the dead to live on in the memory 
of the living, it is harder to explain why the ancient dead should 
be granted little or no right to posthumous bodily integrity 
when the recently dead have significant rights in relation to the 
same interests. 
V. CONCLUSION
Laws granting a right to posthumous bodily integrity 
demonstrate that American society considers it appropriate to let 
individuals make many decisions about what will happen to 
their own dead bodies, even in the face of compelling competing 
interests, such as those of potential organ recipients.  Given the 
widespread nature of Americans’ right to make binding 
decisions about the treatment of their corpses it could be argued 
that a general right to posthumous bodily integrity exists; 
although, it is not my aim to argue for the existence of such a 
general right, especially given variation between states on some 
issues, such as the ability to decide how one’s body will be 
disposed or the ability to refuse an autopsy.  It is important to 
note, however, that the legal right to make decisions about the 
treatment of one’s corpse is not narrow or limited, for example, 
to the organ donation context.  Rather, the law sets out a wide 
range of contexts in which, within reason, individuals have 
priority in deciding what happens to their own bodies after 
death. 
It is often unclear, however, whether these laws derive from 
a view that the dead, themselves, have sufficient moral status to 
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be deserving of an ongoing right to posthumous bodily 
integrity; or whether they derive from a view that the dead have 
insufficient moral status, but that it is nevertheless important for 
the living to have confidence that their wishes regarding the 
treatment of their corpses will be respected.  To the extent that a 
right to posthumous bodily integrity applies even to those 
whose wishes are unknown, this is easier to reconcile with the 
view that the dead have an ongoing interest in posthumous 
bodily integrity.  However, the different treatment of the ancient 
and recent dead is more consistent with a view that only the 
living have an interest in posthumous bodily integrity. 
It is impossible to say with any certainty whether the 
bearers of legal rights to posthumous bodily integrity are the 
dead or only the living because: a) legislators appear not to have 
explicitly considered the issue in enacting laws; and b) there are 
often multiple possible explanations for the law’s requirements.  
For example, the fact that the UAGA requires consent for organ 
donation even from those whose wishes are unknowable could 
reflect a view that the dead have an interest in posthumous 
bodily integrity, that in that situation families’ interest in 
deciding what should happen to the corpses of their family 
members is entitled to considerable weight, or that a law that 
drew a distinction on the basis of whether one’s wishes are 
knowable would be politically unpalatable. 
Thus, any conclusions drawn from the structure of these 
laws as to whether the dead are viewed as rights-holders are 
speculative.  However, the value of the exercise is to 
demonstrate the moral implications of different interferences 
with a corpse depending on the approach one takes to the 
identity of the rights-holder.  With this analysis in place, a 
legislator or member of the public who has a view about 
whether the dead are properly bearers of rights (and if so, what 
kinds of rights) can make policy arguments that properly 
balance the protection of posthumous bodily integrity against 
competing interests in the treatment of a corpse.  By considering 
whose interest in posthumous bodily integrity was being 
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protected and why, lawmakers might find ways to increase the 
supply of donor organs or research cadavers without causing 
any additional harm to recognized interests.  For example, if we 
agreed that the dead have no interests, we would presumably 
consider it more acceptable to take the organs of those whose 
wishes, while alive, are unknown.  Alternately, if the dead do 
have interests, legislators might choose to give greater legal 
protection to the bodies of the ancient dead.  They might 
institute bans on public display where it could reasonably be 
inferred that the deceased would have opposed display, as is the 
case with Bodies: The Exhibition.
In focusing on individuals’ interest in posthumous bodily 
integrity, the aim has not been to suggest that this should be the 
only, or even the primary, basis for setting policy regarding the 
treatment of corpses.  The arguments above are not inconsistent 
with a view that we should conscript organs, even in the face of 
opposition, or that Body Worlds-type displays are undignified.  
This article has little to say about how much weight should be 
given to a right to posthumous bodily integrity when it conflicts 
with competing rights.  Rather, it has shown that there are 
implications for moral conduct, and thus for policy, in relation to 
dead bodies that flow from how one construes an interest in 
posthumous bodily integrity.  If the dead have no interests – if 
they cannot be the proper subject of rights because they do not 
have sufficient moral status – then our treatment of corpses 
cannot harm the dead.  It can, of course, hurt the living in 
various ways, but not the dead.  If that is the case, then the only 
reason to abide by the wishes of the dead is to benefit the living 
– either living individuals who care that their own corpses will 
be treated in a certain way, living members of a society that 
wants to be the kind of society that respects the wishes of the 
dead, living people who stand to benefit from donated organs or 
medical research, or living loved ones of the deceased who have 
a stake in how the corpse is treated.  If, however, the dead 
continue to have a moral stake in the treatment of their bodies, 
they have a claim to a certain kind of treatment even if we don’t 
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know what treatment they actually wanted for their corpses. 
Posthumous bodily integrity clearly matters, but it is 
unclear why.  If we could agree as to why it matters, we could 
enact laws to protect it in a more principled and consistent 
manner.  Even if we cannot agree, we can at least be clear about 
what it is we are trying to achieve in enacting laws that protect 
posthumous bodily integrity. 
